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Abstract 
Although people have been shown to rely on feelings to make judgments, the conditions that 
moderate this reliance have not been systematically reviewed and conceptually integrated. 
This article addresses this gap by jointly reviewing moderators of the reliance on both subtle 
affective feelings and cognitive feelings of ease-of-retrieval. The review revealed that 
moderators of the reliance on affective and cognitive feelings are remarkably similar and can 
be grouped into five major categories: (1) the salience of the feelings, (2) the 
representativeness of the feelings for the target, (3) the relevance of the feelings to the 
judgment, (4) the evaluative malleability of the judgment, and (5) the level of processing 
intensity. Based on the reviewed evidence, it is concluded that the use of feelings as 
information is a frequent event and a generally sensible judgmental strategy, rather than a 
constant source of error. Avenues for future research are discussed.  
 
Word count: 148 
 
Keywords: feelings, subjective experiences, affect, mood, ease-of-retrieval, moderator 
 
 When feelings are used as information      - 3 - 
When Do People Rely on Affective and Cognitive Feelings in Judgment? A Review 
Theorizing in the various social sciences has historically assumed that judgments are 
based solely on content information. As exemplified by the computational person metaphor, 
individuals were assumed to form judgments by systematically evaluating all available and 
pertinent content information in an unbiased manner. However, over the last thirty to thirty-
five years, a considerable amount of psychological research has challenged this assumption 
by showing that judgments may be formed not only on the basis of content information, but 
also on the basis of feelings, such as being in a positive or negative mood, having positive or 
negative feelings towards a target, or experiencing ease or difficulty when recalling some 
piece of information from memory. It is by now well accepted that affective and cognitive 
feelings can exert powerful influences on judgments, and the recent upsurge in scientific as 
well as public interest in the impact of feelings pays tribute to this seminal scientific advance.  
Although numerous studies have demonstrated that feelings may influence judgments 
(for reviews, see Forgas, 1995a; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Pham, 2008; 
Schwarz, 1990, 1998, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), the conditions under which these 
influences take place have not been comprehensively reviewed. This is surprising, 
considering that much can be learned from such a review. First and foremost, such an 
analysis clarifies when feelings are likely to influence judgments, thereby delineating the 
prevalence of such effects outside psychological laboratories. This is critical, because 
knowing that an effect can occur does not tell much about its ecological importance, since an 
effect that can be shown may still be unlikely to occur in general. Hence, after establishing an 
effect (in so-called “first-generation” research, Zanna & Fazio, 1982), it is important to 
investigate the conditions under which the effect is likely to occur (in second- or third-
generation research). To date, a variety of such conditions have been identified both within 
the realm of affective feelings and within the realm of cognitive feelings. Yet, while some of 
these findings have been reviewed previously (e.g., Forgas, 1995a; Pham, 2008; Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007), moderators were not the real focus of these reviews and often examined only 
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selectively or tangentially. Unlike these previous reviews, this paper puts the spotlight on 
moderators of the reliance on feelings and offers for the first time a formal overview.  
This review is also unique in that it jointly reviews both variables that moderate the 
influence of affective feelings, and variables that moderate the influence of cognitive feelings 
in judgment. This joint review is motivated by recent theoretical suggestions that affective 
and cognitive feelings share many commonalities (e.g., Bless & Forgas, 2000; Clore, 1992; 
Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1996, 2007; Strack, 1992). Such a joint review 
allows for a broader picture of the role of feelings in judgment and bridges the often-
unconnected literatures on the role of affective and cognitive feelings in the fields of social 
psychology and consumer psychology.  
As with any review, the scope of the present paper is necessarily restricted. First, this 
review focuses on the interplay between feelings and judgments. Although this focus is 
extended, when appropriate, to related variables such as choices and decisions, other 
dependent variables such as information search or memory are not considered (for reviews 
of the effects of feelings on cognitive processes such as attention, encoding, or storage, see 
Bless, 2001; Forgas, 1995a; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Also, we do not review findings where 
the impact of feelings on judgments is mediated by differences in processing, for example, 
findings indicating that different affective states trigger different degrees of stereotyping (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). 
Second, this review focuses on one type of affective feeling—subtle incidental or 
integral affective experiences—and one type of cognitive feeling—subtle experiences of 
ease-of-retrieval. Other types of affective feelings, such as strong emotions, or other types of 
cognitive feelings, such as feelings of knowing, are not reviewed. We focus on these two 
particular types of feelings for two related reasons. First, most studies on factors moderating 
the reliance on feelings have investigated these two types of feelings. Second, whereas 
there are established methodological paradigms for isolating the reliance on these two types 
of feelings—Schwarz and Clore’s (1983) misattribution paradigm for subtle affective feelings, 
and Schwarz and colleagues’ (1991) ease-of-retrieval paradigm for ease-of-retrieval 
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feelings—equivalent paradigms are currently not available or are not as easily administered 
for other types of feelings. As a consequence of this, the proposed conclusions are, strictly 
speaking, empirically restricted to these two particular examples of affective and cognitive 
feelings. This important caveat notwithstanding, there is reason to believe that the proposed 
conclusions can be extended to other affective and cognitive feelings (e.g., Clore, 1992), 
even though not all moderators may be equally important with all feelings, as discussed in 
more detail later.  
Third, this review focuses on findings in which individuals are found to differ in the 
extent to which they rely on their feelings in forming judgments. Findings in which individuals 
differ in terms of the conclusions that they draw from their feelings (but not in terms of the 
extent to which they rely on their feelings) are not included. For example, the finding that 
incidental mood states or feelings of ease-of-retrieval cease to influence judgments when 
individuals are led to attribute these feelings to a source other than the target (e.g., Schwarz 
et al., 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) is a typical example of moderation of the reliance on 
feelings, in that different attributions about the source of the feelings lead to different degrees 
of reliance on these feelings. In contrast, the finding that a positive mood state increases 
evaluation of a happy story but decreases evaluation of a sad story (Martin, Abend, 
Sedikides, & Green, 1997) is not considered to be a case of moderated reliance on feelings, 
because even though the feelings are interpreted differently depending on the nature of the 
story, they are presumably relied on to the same extent in both cases.  
Finally, this review focuses on findings that highlight the experiential quality of 
feelings, because it is their experiential quality that sets feelings apart from activated content, 
and contributes to their often unique impact on judgments and decisions (e.g., Bless, 2002; 
Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). 
This review therefore puts the spotlight on studies in which the impact of feelings on 
judgments can be conceptualized as direct and not mediated by activated content 
information, as further detailed below. 
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Based on this set of selection criteria, a comprehensive literature search was 
performed, which yielded a set of 55 contributions from the domain of affective feelings, and 
34 contributions from the domain of cognitive feelings. Before turning to this evidence, 
however, we first summarize what is meant by “feelings” and how they are thought to 
influence judgments.  
Feelings and judgments 
In this section, we first define what is typically meant by “feelings.” After outlining 
evidence of the influence of feelings on judgment, we then distinguish between two primary 
theoretical accounts of this influence: the feelings-as-information account, and the priming-
account. Focusing on the former account, we then identify some core tenets of this account, 
from which we derive five general hypotheses about the types of variables that are likely to 
moderate the reliance on feelings.  
Different kinds of feelings 
Clore (1992) suggests that feelings can be grouped into three categories: affective, 
bodily, and cognitive feelings. Affective feelings are valenced subjective experiences that 
may or may not be directly related to an object (e.g., Frijda, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). 
They encompass moods, emotions, and other affective experiences. Bodily feelings include 
reflections of physical processes such as hunger or pain, as well as proprioceptive feedback, 
such as from arm flexion or extension (Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993) or from facial 
expressions (e.g., Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Cognitive feelings include experiential 
states that reflect activated content information or accompany cognitive processes, such as 
feelings of familiarity (e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) or the ease with which information can be 
retrieved from memory (ease-of-retrieval, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Such 
experiential states have been called cognitive because they are associated with thinking and 
memory processes. They are considered feelings because they are experienced much like 
affective or bodily feelings are (for an integrative review on fluency experiences, see Alter & 
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Oppenheimer, 2009; for a recent review on the truth-effect, see Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & 
Wänke, in press). The present review focuses on subtle affective and cognitive feelings. 
Affective feelings can be characterized as either incidental or integral to the target 
(Bodenhausen, 1993). Incidental feelings are due to a source other than the judgmental 
target and are thus, objectively, unconnected to the target, such as the positive mood state 
we may be in on a sunny day while evaluating a job candidate. However, through 
misattribution mechanisms discussed later, these feelings may appear related to the target. 
In contrast, integral feelings come from the target itself: they can be defined as those that are 
“elicited by features of the target object, whether these features are real, perceived, or only 
imagined” (Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2008, p. 308). Examples may be the attraction 
experienced toward a beautiful stranger, or the anxiety experienced when thinking about an 
impending public speech. The distinction between incidental and integral affective feelings 
thus lies in the objective source of feelings. This distinction has recently been extended to 
the realm of cognitive feelings (Schwarz, 2008). For instance, feelings of ease or difficulty 
may be incidental if they are due to causes unrelated to the inherent accessibility of the 
material to be retrieved, such as when contracting the corrugator muscle (forehead) is 
perceived as a signal of effort (Stepper & Strack, 1993). In contrast, feelings of ease or 
difficulty are integral if they are due to the accessibility of the material itself (e.g., differential 
accessibility of extreme vs. less extreme causes of death, Combs & Slovic, 1979). Note that 
because incidental feelings can be attributed to the target, it may reversely be the case that 
integral feelings elicited by the target are not perceived as resulting from the target (e.g., 
Pham, 1998, Exp. 3). Therefore, it is not the objective relationship between the feelings and 
the target that matters in judgment, but the person’s subjective perception of this relationship, 
a notion known as representativeness (Pham, 1998; Strack, 1992). 
How feelings influence judgments 
Affective feelings. Affective feelings have been shown to influence a wide variety of 
judgments, including life satisfaction (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Strack, Schwarz, & 
Gschneidinger, 1985), consumption intention (e.g., Pham, 1998), risk estimates (e.g., Gasper 
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& Clore, 2000; Johnson & Tversky, 1983), pleasantness of pictures (e.g., Isen & Shalker, 
1982), and attitudes toward political issues (e.g., Forgas & Moylan, 1987). In fact, the list of 
judgments on which affective feelings have been shown to have an impact appears to be 
endless (for reviews, e.g., Forgas, 1995a; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Pham, 2004, 2008; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007), clearly showing that judgments can be influenced by affective 
feelings.  
While there is little doubt that affective feelings can influence judgments, the 
processes by which these influences are thought to take place have been debated. Two 
major types of accounts of the influence of affective feelings on judgments have been 
advanced (Clore, 1992; Forgas, 1995a). According to the first type, affective feelings can be 
conceptualized as experiential information that people rely on when forming judgments (e.g., 
Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988; Wyer & Carlston, 1979). Called the affect-as-information 
hypothesis, this account holds that feelings constitute a source of information in itself. This 
type of information is thought to be qualitatively different from activated content information, 
because feelings are experienced (e.g., Bless, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). When judging 
targets, individuals are thought to be asking themselves private questions such as “How do I 
feel about it?” (Schwarz & Clore, 1988), and then using this experiential information to form a 
variety of judgments (Pham, 2008). According to this account, affective feelings function as 
“internal signals that provide consciously available feedback” (Clore, Wyer et al., 2001, p. 30; 
see also Morris, 1989, for an overview ). The affect-as-information account thus holds 
(a) that judgments can be genuinely feeling-based, (b) that feelings influence judgments 
directly, and (c) that the reliance on feelings in judgment is inferential rather than purely 
automatic (Pham, 2004). We will refer to this account as the feelings-as-information or FI-
account. 
The second type of account posits that affective feelings influence judgments by 
influencing the content that comes to mind (e.g., Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995a; Forgas & 
Bower, 1987; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). This account holds that affective feelings 
are an integral part of cognitive representations and activate affectively congruent concepts 
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or memories by way of spreading activation in an associated network structure. It is this 
activated content information that is integrated into judgments. In this account the impact of 
feelings on judgments is thus posited to be indirect and mediated by the activation of content 
information. The judgment process implied by this account is not feeling-based but content-
based, in that it is content (activated by affective feelings) that is integrated in judgments. In 
the present review, this perspective is called the priming-account. 
In summary, the FI-account suggests a direct influence of feelings on judgments via 
experiential information, whereas the priming-account proposes an indirect influence via 
activated content information. Forgas (1995a) integrated both accounts into a multi-process 
model called the affect infusion model, which holds that both accounts coexist and 
complement rather than contradict each other (for a comparison, see Bless, 2001). Because 
this review focuses on the distinct experiential quality of feelings as input to judgment, it is 
restricted to studies in which the impact of affective feelings on judgments can be 
conceptualized as experiential rather than mediated by activated content information, that is, 
findings that either have been accrued within the FI-account or can be most parsimoniously 
reconciled with its tenets.1  
Cognitive feelings. Similar to affective feelings, cognitive feelings of ease-of-retrieval 
have been shown to influence a wide variety of judgments, such as frequency estimates 
(e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2008; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), assertiveness judgments 
(e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), attitudes towards political issues (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 
2007; Ruder & Bless, 2003), health-related judgments (e.g., Raghubir & Menon, 1998), or 
product evaluations (e.g., Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997). Although this is only a short 
list (for reviews see Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), it clearly shows that judgments 
can be influenced by such cognitive feelings.  
With respect to the process underlying the effects of cognitive feelings of ease-of-
retrieval, it has been generally assumed that cognitive feelings enter the judgmental process 
directly. Parallel to the affect-as-information account, individuals are thought to use cognitive 
feelings as a source of information other than relying solely on content information when 
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forming judgments of many kinds (e.g., Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz et al., 1991). Therefore, this 
perspective will also be referred to as fitting an FI-account.  
Some findings pertaining to cognitive feelings can be attributed either to direct effects 
of the feelings, or to the use of activated thought content. Methods that allow the two types of 
explanations to be disentangled are therefore important. A widely used paradigm—hereafter 
referred to as the ease-of-retrieval paradigm—was introduced by Schwarz and colleagues 
(1991). In this paradigm, participants are asked to recall differential amounts of information, 
for instance, few versus many instances of previous assertive behaviors. Afterwards, 
participants are asked to form a related judgment, such as evaluating their own 
assertiveness. If individuals rely on their experiences of ease-of-retrieval, the recall of few 
examples, which is easy, will lead to higher ratings of assertiveness than the recall of many 
examples, which is difficult. After all, if it is easy (difficult) to come up with instances of one’s 
own assertiveness, chances are that one is (is not) assertive. Such a pattern of results is 
generally referred to as an ease-of-retrieval effect. It is important to note that if individuals 
relied on the content of the information retrieved in forming their judgments, the recall of 
many (as opposed to few) examples would have resulted in higher perceptions of 
assertiveness. This pattern would be opposite to the results expected when relying on 
subjective feelings of ease-of-retrieval. Hence, patterns of results observed under Schwarz 
and colleagues’ (1991) ease-of-retrieval paradigm are telling in regard to the underlying 
processes, a feature of particular importance in the present context.  
Process tenets of the FI-account 
Reflecting our interest in feelings as information, we next outline some core 
characteristics of the FI-perspective. Because moderating evidence can be diagnostic about 
underlying processes (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005), process assumptions may reversely 
allow for predictions about moderation. Following this logic, we build on the reviewed 
characteristics to derive general hypotheses about the types of variables that may be 
expected to moderate the reliance on affective and cognitive feelings in judgment.  
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Perhaps the most critical characteristic of the FI-perspective is that feelings are 
assumed to enter judgments as information inputs (e.g., Schwarz, 1990). Consequently, 
general principles that govern the integration of information in judgment (e.g., Anderson, 
1981) should apply to the use of feelings, as well. For instance, given that inputs that are 
relatively more accessible are generally more influential in judgments (e.g., Feldman & 
Lynch, 1988; Sherman & Corty, 1984), one would expect that feelings are more likely to 
influence judgment when they are relatively salient compared to other pieces of information 
(moderator category 1). Likewise, because the impact of extraneous information sources is 
generally stronger the more malleable a judgment is, feelings should exert a stronger 
influence on judgments that are evaluatively malleable (moderator category 4). 
Second, the FI-perspective generally assumes that feelings operate as single pieces 
of information that integrate a wide variety of information into a unified whole (e.g., Clore & 
Parrott, 1994; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; for supporting empirical evidence, see Greifeneder 
& Bless, 2007; Ruder & Bless, 2003). If this is the case, the conditions that govern the use of 
feelings in judgment may be similar to those that foster the reliance on other single pieces of 
information, such as heuristic cues. In particular, one would generally expect the reliance on 
feelings to be higher under conditions of low processing intensity (moderator category 5)—
which is consistent with the assumption that the reliance on feelings is a lean process (e.g., 
Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001).  
Finally, the FI-perspective assumes that the use of feelings in judgment is governed 
by metacognitive assessments of perceived informational value (e.g., Avnet & Pham, 2007; 
Greifeneder, 2007; Schwarz, 2004). It is generally assumed that for a feeling to be perceived 
as a useful source of information, it needs to be perceived as emanating from or being about 
the judgmental target (“being representative”), as well as being relevant for the judgment in 
question (Pham, 1998). Accordingly, one would expect that metacognitive assessments in 
terms of both representativeness (moderator category 3) and relevance (moderator 
category 4) moderate the use of feelings in judgment. 
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While the above characteristics apply similarly to the reliance on affective and 
cognitive feelings, there is at least one notable difference: affective feelings generally seem 
to require less interpretation than cognitive feelings. For example, whereas a positive 
affective reaction toward a target is easily mapped onto a liking of this target, an ease 
experience while recalling information about the same target needs to be further interpreted, 
for instance, in terms of frequency (e.g., Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). Similarly, much of the 
meaning of affective feelings is about valence (the positivity of negativity of things, e.g., 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007; but see Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), 
whereas the meaning of cognitive feelings is potentially broader (e.g., being indicative of 
frequency, confidence, truth, etc.). This is consistent with recent theoretical suggestions that 
whereas cognitive feeling experiences are open to numerous possible interpretations 
(Schwarz, Song, & Xu, 2008), affective feelings seem to be interpreted in terms of a more 
restricted lexicon (Pham, 2008). Finally, whereas affective feelings can provide information 
about the target directly (e.g., “I feel uncomfortable around him: I should probably not trust 
him”), cognitive feelings such as those of ease-of-retrieval generally provide information in 
relation to some content about the target (e.g., “It is hard to remember when he last said 
‘hello’ to me: he is probably an unfriendly person”). All three aspects pertain to the meaning 
of a feeling and may therefore result in differential moderation effects when the reliance on 
feelings depends on what a feeling means, as discussed in more detail later.  
Conclusion 
The first part of this review identified different kinds of feelings and highlighted their 
influences on a wide variety of judgments. It was noted that two major types of processes 
can account for the influence of affective and cognitive feelings on judgments: a feeling-as-
information-account (FI-account), and a thought-priming (or content-activation) account. 
Given our focus on the distinct experiential quality of feelings (as opposed to content 
information), essential assumptions that characterize the use of feelings as information were 
reviewed and used to formulate broad hypotheses about likely moderators of the reliance on 
feelings in judgment.  
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Empirical Moderators of the Reliance on Feelings 
In this second part, we review the conditions under which affective feelings and 
cognitive feelings influence judgment. This review is organized in terms of the three core 
components of this reliance: the feelings themselves (e.g., a positive or negative mood 
state), the target of the judgment (e.g., a politician), and the judgment itself (e.g., the 
politician’s judged trustworthiness). First, focusing on the feelings themselves, we examine 
how the salience of the feelings moderates the reliance on these feelings. Second, focusing 
on the relation between the feeling and the target of the judgment, we examine how the 
degree to which the feelings are perceived to emanate from the target—that is, their 
representativeness—moderates the reliance on feelings. Third, focusing on the relation 
between the feelings and the judgment, we examine how the relevance of the feelings for the 
judgment moderates the reliance on feelings. Fourth, focusing on the nature of the judgment 
itself, we examine how the evaluative malleability of the judgment moderates the reliance on 
feelings. Finally, we examine how the intensity with which individuals engage in judgmental 
processes moderates the reliance on feelings. These five categories of moderators serve as 
major structural elements.  
Note that by organizing the empirical evidence based on the way variables influence 
the reliance on feelings—for instance by changing perceptions of representativeness—rather 
than based on the variables themselves—for example, “expertise”—this review adopts a 
functional perspective rather than an operational one. This organization allows for a more 
coherent and parsimonious model of the reliance on feelings, which lends itself to testable 
predictions for future research. As a result, however, a given operational variable (e.g., 
expertise) may appear in different functional categories of moderators, depending on the role 
that the variable plays in a particular empirical finding. For instance, because expertise has 
been shown to influence both the perceived relevance of feelings and the malleability of 
judgments, this variable is discussed under both categories of moderators.  
With this in mind, we now turn to the empirical evidence of five different categories of 
moderators of reliance on feelings: (1) the salience of the feelings, (2) the representativeness 
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of the feelings in relation to the target, (3) the relevance of the feelings to the judgment, 
(4) the evaluative malleability of the judgment, and (5) the level of processing intensity.  
Salience of feelings 
A growing number of findings suggest that feelings are more likely to influence 
judgment when salient. Salience is broadly defined here around the notion that some pieces 
of information are more attended to than others. Their being “more attended to” may be due 
to features inherent in the information itself (as suggested by Higgins, 1996; see also Taylor 
& Fiske, 1978), or to task characteristics or individual predilections that cause some pieces of 
information to “stick out” relative to other pieces of information (see also Feldman & Lynch, 
1988; Sherman & Corty, 1984). In the case of the politician example introduced above, 
salience refers to the extent to which a positive or negative feeling “stands out” and is 
attended to more than other pieces of information.  
The evidence on salience as a moderator is reviewed below, jointly for affective and 
cognitive feelings. A concise summary is provided in Table 1, separately for affective and 
cognitive feelings. A conceptual distinction is made between contextual sources of salience 
of feelings (context-related) and dispositional sources (disposition-related).  
Context-related salience 
Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) observed that judgments were influenced by positive 
and negative mood states more when the moods were assessed in a manipulation check 
prior to dependent variables. The manipulation check presumably increased the salience of 
participants’ affective experiences, thereby increasing the likelihood that these were used in 
judgment (see also White & McFarland, 2009). Similarly, with respect to cognitive feelings, 
Kühnen (2010) found that ease-of-retrieval effects were confined to conditions in which 
feelings of ease-of-retrieval were assessed as a manipulation check before the dependent 
variables.2  
Albarracín and Kumkale (2003, Exp. 3) further observed that explicitly focusing 
participants’ attention on their affective reactions increased the impact of incidental affective 
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feelings on attitudinal judgments, presumably due to heightened salience of the feelings. 
However, this effect occurred only for participants low in processing intensity, as participants 
with higher levels of processing intensity were expected to realize the undue influence of 
their incidental feelings and therefore discount them as unrepresentative. Interestingly, when 
individuals were not focused on their feelings, incidental feelings had a stronger influence on 
judgment when processing intensity was moderate compared to when it was low (Albarracín 
& Kumkale, 2003, Exp. 1 and 2). This is presumably because when the salience of feelings is 
not increased experimentally, some processing intensity is needed to identify feelings as a 
potential source of information. It is only when even higher levels of processing intensity are 
reached that the above-described discounting for lack of representativeness takes place (for 
further details on Albarracín and Kumkale’s 2003 model, see the section on processing 
intensity). 
In the above studies, salience was increased by means of manipulation checks or 
explicit instructions. Using a more subtle approach, Raghubir and Menon (2005, Exp. 2) 
influenced the salience of cognitive feelings by varying context information. Participants who 
had recalled either two or ten instances of eating out at a restaurant were asked to indicate 
the amount of money spent during these outings. When the instances were to be recalled 
from a recent past, participants reported spending higher amounts of money after recalling 
two instances than after recalling ten, reflecting an ease-of-retrieval effect. However, when 
the instances to be recalled were from a distant past, the pattern reversed. This is 
presumably because people expect older memories to be difficult to retrieve, rendering the 
experience of difficulty of retrieval no longer salient. Extending these findings, Hansen and 
Wänke (2008) found that experiences of ease-of-retrieval are more likely to influence 
judgments if these experiences are discrepant from an implicit standard or expectation. In 
one study, participants were semantically primed with concepts of ease or difficulty before 
ease-of-retrieval was manipulated. Consistent with the notion that the contextual salience of 
feelings moderates their influence on judgments, the authors found that feelings of ease-of-
retrieval influenced judgments especially when these feelings were discrepant from the 
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primed standard. Presumably this is because feelings of ease-of-retrieval, and signals in 
general, are more likely to be detected and used if salient (see also Whittlesea & Williams, 
1998).  
Disposition-related salience 
A growing number of findings suggest that dispositional variables may also influence 
whether affective and cognitive feelings “stick out” and therefore are relied on. For instance, 
Gasper and Clore (2000, Exp. 1) manipulated participants’ incidental moods and further 
divided participants into two groups, based on their tendency to pay attention to their feelings 
(assessed with a short version of the Trait Meta-Mood Scale; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, 
Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). The authors found that the incidental mood manipulation had 
stronger influence on judgments among participants with a chronic tendency to focus on their 
affective reactions. Haddock, Zanna, and Esses (1994) divided their sample based on affect 
intensity—a 40-item measure reflecting dispositional differences in the strength with which 
individuals experience affective feelings (Larsen & Diener, 1987)—and found more 
pronounced effects of incidental mood states on attitudes toward stereotyped groups for 
individuals who scored high on affect intensity.  
Another instance of disposition-related salience is Pham’s (1998, Exp. 1) finding that 
reliance on affective feelings in decisions is greater among individuals categorized as 
visualizers as opposed to verbalizers (determined via the 22-item Style-of-Processing scale; 
Childers, Houston, & Heckler, 1985). Presumably this is because visualizers are more likely 
“to see how it feels” (Pham, 1998, p. 147), thus increasing the relative salience of affective 
reactions. Relatedly, Ciarrochi and Forgas (2000; Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2001) hypothesized 
and found that feelings influenced judgments particularly among participants scoring high as 
opposed to low in openness to feelings (determined via the eight-item Openness-to-Feelings 
scale; Costa & McCrae, 1985). Finally, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999, Exp. 2) observed that 
integral affect toward the options influenced the choices of participants categorized as 
impulsive, but not those of participants categorized as prudent (based on three items from 
the Consumer Impulsiveness Scale; Puri, 1996). This is presumably because, compared to 
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prudent individuals, the focus of impulsive individuals may be narrowed to affective reactions, 
especially when processing resources are scarce. 
Conclusion 
The reliance on affective feelings and cognitive feelings appears to similarly depend 
on the salience of the feelings. Specifically, the impact of feelings on judgments seems to be 
stronger when the feelings are relatively salient. This relative salience is determined by both 
contextual variables and personality characteristics. Although the evidence to date in the 
domain of cognitive feelings is limited to contextual variables, it seems likely that future 
research will show that dispositional determinants of the salience of cognitive feelings have 
similar moderating effects.  
On the surface, the above findings seem to conflict with the well-established affect-
as-information finding that directing people’s attention to the actual source of their incidental 
mood states typically reduces (rather than increases) the impact of these mood states on 
judgments (e.g., Gorn, Goldberg, & Basu, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). However, Siemer 
and Reisenzein (1998; see also White & McFarland, 2009) convincingly argue that this 
conflict is only apparent, as the salience of one’s feelings needs to be differentiated from the 
salience of the cause of one’s feelings. Misattribution studies in the feelings-as-information 
literature typically manipulate the salience of the cause of the incidental feelings (e.g., the 
weather or music, Schwarz & Clore, 1983), whereas the findings reviewed above pertain to 
the effects of the salience of the feelings themselves. Still, it may appear surprising that 
similar operationalizations, such as assessing the manipulation check prior to dependent 
variables, either increase the salience of feelings themselves, or increase the salience of the 
cause of the feelings, eventually resulting in opposite judgment outcomes. Recent theorizing 
by Albarracín and Kumkale (2003) offers a way to reconcile this seeming puzzle. The authors 
suggest that in order for feelings to influence judgments, feelings need to be both identified 
and perceived as representative of the target. In the Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) and 
White and McFarland (2009) studies, the salience manipulations presumably helped the 
incidental feelings to be identified without undermining their perceived representativeness. In 
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contrast, in typical affect-as-information misattribution studies such as Schwarz and Clore’s 
(1983), salience manipulations were such that incidental feelings were not only identified, but 
also perceived to be non-representative of the target.  
The finding that the salience of feelings itself increases the feelings’ influence on 
judgment also appears to conflict with the well-documented finding that even mood 
manipulations that are very subtle and seemingly weak often suffice to influence judgments 
(e.g., Isen & Levin, 1972; Isen et al., 1978; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Again, this conflict is 
only apparent, because while stronger feelings tend to be more salient, the salience of 
feelings is not solely determined by their intensity. A feeling experience may be very subtle, 
yet salient if some factors make it stand out in the attention field. Similarly, a feeling 
experience may be intense, yet not salient if other pieces of information are more attention-
grabbing. 
Representativeness of feelings 
A second category of moderators emerges from findings showing that feelings are 
more likely to be relied on in judgment when the feelings are perceived to be representative 
of the target in question. Representativeness is defined as the degree to which a feeling is 
perceived to emanate from the target and reflect essential characteristics of the target. In the 
politician example mentioned earlier, representativeness would refer to the degree to which 
the positive or negative feelings appear to be caused by and are informative about the 
politician (the target). The notion of representativeness is to be differentiated from the notion 
of relevance, discussed in the next section, which holds that there may be differences in the 
perceived materiality of feelings for a judgment, independent of their representativeness (see 
also Pham, 2008). Note that the distinction between representativeness and relevance is well 
established in the literature on affective feelings (Pham, 1998; White & McFarland, 2009), 
and parallels, for instance, Schwarz and Clore’s (2007) differentiation between “perceived 
informational value” and “perceived relevance.”3 Both representativeness and relevance 
have been conceptualized as metacognitive assessments (e.g., Avnet & Pham, 2007; Bless 
& Schwarz, 2010).  
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Studies investigating the moderating impact of representativeness can be categorized 
into two groups. Some studies primarily manipulate whether the feelings are perceived to 
emanate from the target. These studies are here referred to as examining “backward-
representativeness,” in that the direction of inference is from the feelings back to the target 
(“Are my feelings caused by X?”). In the politician example, backward-representativeness 
would refer to whether the feelings are perceived to be caused by the politician. Other 
studies primarily focus on whether a given feeling is perceived to be applicable to a specific 
target. These studies are here referred to as examining “forward-representativeness,” in that 
the direction of inference is from the feeling to the target (“Are my feelings telling me 
something about X”?). In the politician example, forward-representativeness would refer to 
whether a given feeling experience appears to be informative about a specific politician.  
As will be apparent, the moderating role played by representativeness has been 
observed with a variety of methodological operationalizations. The findings show that 
representativeness is not necessarily “all or nothing”—such as when people realize or 
believe that the real cause of their feelings is unrelated to the target (e.g., Schwarz et al., 
1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983); rather, it is often a matter of degree—such as when some 
feelings appear to be more representative for a given target than other feelings, or when 
given feelings seem to be more representative for some targets than for other targets (e.g., 
Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006). A concise overview of the reviewed evidence is 
provided in Table 2. 
Backward-representativeness 
The very idea of feelings-as-information implies that feelings are used as information 
only to the extent that they are deemed informative with respect to the target. If there is 
reasonable doubt, feelings should not be used as a basis for judgment. Consequently, if one 
wants to demonstrate that feelings are used as information (instead of feelings exerting their 
influence via priming or automatic evaluative conditioning), a compelling methodology would 
be to discredit the feelings’ perceived informational value. Very often, this is achieved by 
providing a plausible cause for the feeling that is unrelated to the target, thus making the 
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feelings unrepresentative of the target. In their classic work, Schwarz and Clore (1983) 
manipulated the representativeness of positive and negative incidental affective feelings by 
introducing an alleged extraneous cause for the feelings (a soundproof room supposedly 
known to induce certain feelings), or by making the feelings’ actual source, the outside 
weather conditions, salient. These manipulations moderated the influence of participants’ 
mood states on judgments such as happiness and life satisfaction. Findings such as these 
are consistent with the FI-account, but not with the processes of automatic spreading-
activation postulated in the priming-account, because the latter should be insensitive to 
representativeness.  
Given that providing a plausible alternative cause for the feeling that is unrelated to 
the target allows researchers to differentiate between the FI- and the priming-account, it 
comes as no surprise that this experimental paradigm has been used extensively in the 
literature, both with incidental affective feelings (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and integral 
affective feelings (e.g., Pham, 1998, Exp. 3). Rather than listing all of these findings, it 
appears worthwhile to reflect on why providing a plausible alternative cause for the feelings 
has such a powerful moderating impact. Key to this question is the concept of attribution, 
which holds that for a feeling to influence judgment, it needs to be attributed to the target in 
question. This process is thought to be automatic (e.g., Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girard, 1990) 
and largely unconstrained (e.g., Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1994; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1996). Moreover, it is controlled by whatever is salient and applicable at the time of 
attribution (temporal contiguity), including the current task to be performed and contextual 
factors (e.g., Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). As a result, affective 
feelings are typically experienced as immediate reactions to whatever the focus of attention 
is at the time of experience—“Why else would I be feeling that way at this moment?”—a 
tendency known as the immediacy principle (Clore, Wyer et al., 2001) or the aboutness 
principle (Higgins, 1996). In general, this default assumption is accurate and adaptive. 
However, it is not infallible and can be tricked by skilled experimentation, as reflected in the 
large number of studies relying on variants of the misattribution principle. 
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Paralleling the findings obtained in the domain of affective feelings, a large body of 
empirical evidence suggests that cognitive feelings are not relied upon in judgment if they are 
attributed to a source that is unrelated to the target. For instance, Schwarz and colleagues 
(1991, Exp. 3) provided half of their participants with an alternative explanation for their 
cognitive feelings. This manipulation reduced the impact of feelings on subsequent 
judgments, presumably because participants perceived their cognitive feelings to be no 
longer representative of the target in question (see also Wänke, Schwarz, & Bless, 1995). As 
with affective feelings, findings that the influence of cognitive feelings depends on attributions 
about the source of the feelings are generally taken as evidence that cognitive feelings are 
used as information in judgment formation. Of greater interest than the sheer number of 
studies documenting such findings is the great variety of alleged sources for the cognitive 
feelings that researchers have provided to participants in these studies. For instance, 
supposed alternative sources for participants’ feelings of ease-of-retrieval include curved 
boxes (Ruder & Bless, 2003, Exp. 3), background color (Greifeneder & Bless, 2007, Exp. 3), 
alleged lack of expertise (Sanna & Schwarz, 2003), or alleged general experiences of other 
participants (Menon & Raghubir, 2003, Exp. 2; Raghubir & Menon, 2001; Winkielman, 
Schwarz, & Belli, 1998). That such a diverse set of explanations all produce similar 
reductions of the effects of cognitive feelings attests to the general nature of this 
phenomenon. 
While the studies reviewed so far varied backward-representativeness by 
manipulating the ostensible cause of the feelings, other studies employed more subtle 
manipulations. For instance, Keltner, Locke, and Audrain (1993, Exp. 3) induced participants 
to attribute negative affect either to the self (“How anxious do you feel about X?”) or to the 
situation (“How anxious does X make you feel?”). The authors observed that negative 
feelings reduced satisfaction judgments only for self- but not situation-referent attributions, 
presumably because the feelings, once attributed to the situation, were not perceived to be 
representative for judging satisfaction. In a similar vein, McFarland, White, and Newth (2003) 
reported that target-unrelated feelings influenced social judgments only for participants 
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unaware of this biasing impact. Finally, Ottati and Isbell (1996) found that incidental affective 
feelings influenced the evaluation of a political candidate in assimilative fashion only among 
individuals with low expertise; among individuals with high expertise, a contrast effect 
occurred. This is presumably because expert individuals were more likely to recognize that 
their incidental feelings were not caused by the target being evaluated, prompting an attempt 
to subtract the incidental feelings from the judgment and causing a contrast effect (Martin, 
Seta, & Crelia, 1990).  
Forward-representativeness 
Representativeness depends not only on people’s attributions about the (undue) 
cause of their feelings, but also on whether the feelings are perceived to be related or 
applicable to the specific target (a “forward” inference, from feeling to target). For instance, 
Gasper and Clore (1998, Exp. 2) reported that incidental feelings of anxiety influenced 
likelihood judgments of personal risks (e.g., getting into conflict with one’s parents), but not 
impersonal risks (e.g., general increases in HIV deaths). This is presumably because 
participants experienced their feelings of anxiety as related to their own risks, but not to 
general risks, producing different levels of perceived representativeness.  
Qiu and Yeung (2008) observed that when multiple options were presented 
sequentially, incidental feelings influenced only the first option to be evaluated. Apparently, 
once feelings are attributed to a target, they are no longer perceived to be representative of 
subsequent targets. Another operationalization of forward-representativeness was suggested 
by Raghunathan and Pham (1999, Exp. 3), who hypothesized that individuals consider their 
feelings to be more representative when making decisions for themselves than when making 
decisions for others. Consistent with this prediction, these authors found that feelings of 
anxiety versus sadness influenced participants’ preferences more strongly when participants 
were deciding for themselves than when they were deciding for someone else. Similarly, 
Hsee and Weber (1997; Loewenstein et al., 2001) found that participants’ predictions of risk 
preferences were more risk-averse for themselves than for (unknown) others, supposedly 
because integral feelings associated with risky options are perceived to be representative of 
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one’s own risk preferences, but not of those of unknown others. In a related manner, Gorn 
and colleagues (2001, Exp. 2) observed that incidental affective feelings influenced 
judgments more strongly when individuals made self-referent evaluations (e.g., “I like the 
ad”) than when they made object-referent evaluations (“The ad is good”). 
In the domain of cognitive feelings, Raghubir and Menon (1998) reported that 
recalling few (which is easy) versus many (which is difficult) AIDS-related behaviors 
increased participants’ perception of their own risk of contracting AIDS. Presumably this is 
because when it is easy to come up with AIDS-related behaviors, people infer that there are 
probably many, suggesting a proneness to risk. Raghubir and Menon additionally found that 
this manipulation influenced participants’ perceptions of risk for themselves, but not for other 
individuals. The authors reasoned that feelings of ease or difficulty associated with the recall 
of instances of one’s own AIDS-related behaviors are representative only for judging one’s 
own risk, but not for judging other individuals’ risk (for conceptually related evidence, see 
Caruso, 2008) .  
Adopting a different approach, Rothman and Hardin (1997) suggested that the 
perceived representativeness of cognitive feelings with respect to judgment targets comes 
from learned patterns of information use. They found that cognitive feelings of ease or 
difficulty of retrieval had stronger influence on judgments about outgroups and close friends 
than on judgments about ingroups and casual acquaintances. According to the authors, this 
is because judgments about outgroups and close friends are habitually related to feelings, 
rendering feelings representative, whereas judgments about ingroups and about casual 
acquaintances are habitually based on content information. 
Combinations of backward- and forward-representativeness 
Some studies also combine backward- and forward representativeness. For instance, 
Keltner, Locke, and Audrain (1993, Exp. 2) had participants attribute their current affective 
feelings either to the exam they had just taken or to things in general. Subsequently, 
participants were asked to evaluate their personal as well as their academic satisfaction. The 
authors hypothesized that attributing feelings to the exam should increase the 
 When feelings are used as information      - 24 - 
representativeness of feelings for evaluating academic satisfaction, but not for evaluating 
personal satisfaction. In contrast, attributing feelings to things in general should increase the 
representativeness of feelings for personal but not academic satisfaction. As expected, the 
feelings influenced satisfaction only when the target matched the attributed source of the 
feelings. This is presumably because the feelings were perceived to be representative of the 
target only when there was a match.  
In a similar vein, Raghunathan, Pham, and Corfman (2006, Exp. 2) varied the 
relatedness between the domains in which feelings of anxiety or sadness were induced and 
the target domains. Specifically, participants were asked to form two decisions. One decision 
concerned trying a new drug, which involved a domain related to the source of anxiety (which 
was also health-related), but not related to the source of sadness (which was linked to the 
loss of someone close). The other decision was about spending time with a friend, which 
involved a domain related to the source of sadness (due to the loss of a close relationship), 
but not related to the source of anxiety. As expected, there was a more pronounced impact 
of either type of feelings when the domains of the feelings and the targets matched than 
when the domains did not match (for conceptually related evidence, see Shen & Wyer, 
2008).  
Conclusion 
A vast body of evidence indicates that both affective and cognitive feelings are more 
likely to be relied on in judgments when they are perceived to be representative of the target 
in question. This representativeness is a function of a variety of factors that fall into two 
categories: those primarily related to the perceived cause of the feelings (backward-
representativeness), and those primarily related to the perceived applicability of the feeling to 
the target (forward-representativeness). The large number of studies reviewed here and the 
large variety of operationalizations employed across studies attests to the importance of 
representativeness as a moderator of the reliance on feelings. It is noteworthy that very 
similar effects of representativeness have been obtained both in the domain of affective 
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feelings and in the domain of cognitive feelings (although the evidence is less extensive in 
the latter).  
Besides documenting an important moderator of the reliance on feelings in judgment, 
the considerable empirical evidence about the effects of representativeness speaks to a 
fundamental conceptual difference between the FI- and the priming-account. According to 
the priming-account, whether or not individuals perceive their mood states as representative 
should not matter in how these states influence judgments. This is because the mood state 
should increase the accessibility of mood-congruent materials regardless of the perceived 
source of the mood state. In contrast to this priming-account prediction, the present review 
indicates an enormous impact of representativeness, which strongly favors a feeling-as-
information interpretation of these effects. Therefore, while we acknowledge that mood-
congruent judgments can be caused by the increased accessibility of mood-congruent 
material, the evidence reviewed here strongly supports the FI-perspective.  
Relevance 
A third category of moderators emerges from findings showing that feelings may or 
may not be used in forming a judgment, depending on whether the feelings are perceived to 
be relevant. Whereas representativeness refers to the relation between the feelings and the 
target (see previous section), relevance refers to the relation between these feelings and the 
judgment. Relevance and representativeness are therefore conceptually independent (Pham, 
1998; see also Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Returning to the politician example, assuming that 
the feelings are perceived to emanate from the target (i.e., be representative), relevance 
refers to the degree to which these feelings are perceived to be informative for judging a 
particular dimension about the politician, for example his or her trustworthiness. 
As with their salience, the relevance of feelings depends on both contextual factors 
(context-related relevance) and dispositional characteristics of the person forming the 
judgment (disposition-related relevance). For instance, feelings toward a given person that 
are deemed representative may appear more relevant when judging this person’s 
trustworthiness in the context of a personal relationship than in the context of a business 
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transaction (context-dependent relevance). Likewise, in judging a person’s trustworthiness, 
feelings may appear more relevant to individuals who generally believe in their feelings when 
making judgments than to those who are generally skeptical of feelings’ evidentiary status 
(disposition-related relevance). A concise overview is provided in Table 3.  
Context-related relevance 
What appears relevant in a given situation depends, among other factors, on the 
evaluator’s goals. Consequently, the evaluator’s goals are likely to moderate the impact of 
feelings on judgments. Putting these conjectures to the test, Pham (1998) investigated 
participants’ reliance on affective feelings in judgments of the intention to go to a movie. 
Participants who were induced into a positive or negative mood state were given either a 
consummatory motive to see a movie (e.g., to have a good time), or an instrumental motive 
(e.g., to qualify for another study). Participants’ affective feelings were found to influence 
their movie-going intentions when they had consummatory motives, but not when they had 
instrumental motives. This is presumably because the experienced feelings were perceived 
to be relevant only when participants had consummatory motives. Importantly, in both goal 
conditions, participants were led to attribute their feelings to the movie itself (as opposed to 
an unrelated source). Thus, the incidental feelings were equally representative for the 
judgment in question, but apparently not equally relevant, thus exemplifying the conceptual 
independence of relevance versus representativeness (for conceptually related evidence, 
see Adaval, 2001; Yeung & Wyer, 2004). 
Related findings by Geuens, Pham, and De Pelsmaker (2010) suggest that context-
related relevance is assessed with great efficiency and flexibility. In their study, consumers 
were asked to watch 20 to 50 TV commercials and to indicate their attitude toward each 
advertised brand. Separate coders rated both the emotional content of each ad and the 
hedonic-versus-utilitarian nature of each advertised product or service. Analyses revealed 
that consumers’ brand attitudes were more influenced by emotional content when the 
advertised product or service was hedonic than when it was utilitarian. This interaction 
between the emotional content of the ad and the product’s or service’s category is 
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noteworthy, considering that respondents saw a large number of commercials in a row and 
were not explicitly asked to pay attention to the emotional content of the ad, or to the 
hedonic/utilitarian nature of each advertised product or service. Thus, it appears that 
respondents spontaneously adjusted their brand-attitude judgments according to the 
perceived relevance of their feelings.  
Further support for the important role of goals was obtained in the context of basic 
regulatory motives. According to regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997), goal pursuit can be 
undertaken with two distinct self-regulatory orientations known as promotion and prevention. 
A promotion focus, which is typically associated with the pursuit of ideals (wishes and 
aspirations), encourages an eager form of self-regulation that emphasizes approach 
strategies and means. In contrast, a prevention focus, which is typically associated with the 
pursuit of oughts (duties and obligations), encourages a vigilant from of self-regulation that 
emphasizes avoidance strategies and means. Pham and Avnet (2004, Exp. 1 to 3) 
hypothesized and found that priming ideals (a promotion focus) encourages the reliance on 
affective feelings in judgment, whereas priming oughts (a prevention focus) discourages it 
(see also Pham & Avnet, 2009, Exp. 3 and 4 ). Additional results further show that this is 
because feelings are perceived to be more informative under a promotion focus than under a 
prevention focus (Pham & Avnet, 2004, Exp. 3), and that promotion-focused individuals are 
more likely to rely on their feelings when these feelings are perceived to be relevant than 
when they are perceived to be irrelevant (Pham & Avnet, 2009, Exp. 3). 
Relatedly, Bosmans and Baumgartner (2005) found that when achievement goals 
were salient, achievement-related feelings (cheerfulness vs. dejection) exerted a stronger 
impact on judgments than protection-related feelings (quiescence vs. agitation). The effect 
reversed when protection goals were salient. This is presumably because feelings were 
perceived to be more informative and relevant when compatible with the person’s active 
goals. 
Other contextual operationalizations of the relevance of feelings involve explicit task 
instructions to either rely on or not rely on feelings in judgment. For instance, Gasper and 
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Clore (2000, Exp. 2) found that affective feelings influenced judgments when participants 
were instructed to use their feelings as a basis for judgment, but not when they were 
instructed to use factual knowledge (see also Pham, 1998, Exp. 2). Presumably this is 
because feelings were deemed less relevant when participants were told to form a judgment 
based on factual knowledge. Subsequent replications and conceptual extensions show that 
this result is robust (Adaval, 2001, Exp. 2; Scarabis, Florack, & Gosejohann, 2006; White & 
McFarland, 2009, Exp. 1).  
Context-related relevance is also apparent in studies conducted by Avnet and Pham 
(2007), who observed that the perceived relevance of affective feelings depends on the 
individual’s subjective history of success when relying on feelings as information. The 
authors theorized that prior success in using affective feelings as information influences the 
trust that individuals have in their feelings, and consequently the relevance they perceive for 
the judgment at hand. Consistent with this hypothesis, affective feelings were relied upon 
more when participants were led to believe that they had been successful in their past 
reliance on their feelings than when they were led to believe that they had been 
unsuccessful. This is presumably because a belief in successful previous reliance on feelings 
as information increased participants’ trust in their feelings and the feelings’ perceived 
relevance in subsequent judgments. 
Finally, Chang and Pham (2010) hypothesized and found that both integral and 
incidental affective feelings are more influential in decisions set in the present than for 
decisions set in the future. One possible explanation is that current feelings are perceived to 
be more relevant when judging targets that are immediate rather than targets that are more 
distant.  
Interestingly, the perceived relevance of feelings may also be contextually determined 
by other feelings: those arising from the person’s (incidental) affective state. In particular, 
Ruder and Bless (2003) hypothesized and found that cognitive feelings of ease-of-retrieval 
have a stronger effect on judgments among happy individuals than among sad individuals. 
Presumably this is because happy individuals, compared to sad individuals, are more likely 
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to rely on general knowledge structures when forming judgments (Bless et al., 1996), as they 
perceive general knowledge structures to be more informative or relevant. Consistent with 
the conceptualization of reliance on ease-of-retrieval as a heuristic process (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973), the tendency to rely on general knowledge structures under happy mood 
states may be expected to foster the reliance on cognitive feelings of ease-of-retrieval, as 
observed by Ruder and Bless (2003). Processing latencies results further showed that happy 
participants took similar amounts of time to form judgments after retrieving few versus many 
pieces of information, presumably because cognitive feelings of ease or difficulty are single 
pieces of information (e.g., Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999). In contrast, sad participants took 
more time after retrieving many rather than few pieces of information, presumably because 
forming content-based judgments takes more time the more pieces of information need to be 
integrated.  
Disposition-related relevance 
The perceived relevance of feelings in judgments also appears to depend on 
dispositional factors, with different feelings being perceived as more relevant by some 
individuals than by others. One dispositional determinant of the perceived relevance of 
momentary feelings is the person’s chronic feeling state. Gasper and Clore (1998) theorized 
that the reliance on momentary feelings increases when these feelings match people’s 
chronic feeling states (trait-affect), because trait-consistent feelings should be perceived to 
be more informative than trait-inconsistent feelings. In line with this proposition, these 
researchers found that compared to individuals scoring low in trait anxiety (determined via 
the State Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970), individuals 
scoring high in trait anxiety were more influenced by their momentary feelings of anxiety in 
judgments of risks, even if it was made salient to them that the source of their momentary 
feelings was unrelated to the target. This is presumably because trait anxiety makes 
momentary feelings of anxiety seem more informative, even if the representativeness of 
these feelings has been questioned.  
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A second dispositional factor that has been shown to moderate the perceived 
relevance of feelings is the individual’s chronic regulatory focus. Extending the finding that 
primed ideals (promotion focus) and oughts (prevention focus) moderate reliance on affective 
feelings, Pham and Avnet (2004, Exp. 4) hypothesized that a chronic promotion focus would 
also encourage the reliance on affective feelings, whereas a chronic prevention focus would 
discourage it (as determined via the Selves Questionnaire; Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & 
Hymes, 1994). Conceptually replicating the findings on primed regulatory foci, it was found 
that chronically accessible ideals increased the influence of affective feelings on judgments, 
whereas chronically accessible oughts decreased it (see also Pham & Avnet, 2009, Exp. 1 
and 2). 
The perceived relevance of and reliance on feelings is also moderated by individuals’ 
self-esteem or self-worth. Harber (2005) hypothesized that individuals high in self-esteem or 
self-worth rely more on their feelings in judgments because they have stronger faith in their 
inner reactions, which therefore seem more relevant when forming a judgment. To test this 
hypothesis, Harber divided participants into groups of high versus low self-esteem (Exp. 1 
and 2, based on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; Rosenberg, 1965), or manipulated 
participants’ momentary self-worth (Exp. 3). In line with the hypothesis, higher levels of self-
esteem or self-worth were associated with stronger affective influences on individuals’ 
judgments.  
Another disposition known to moderate the perceived relevance of feelings is domain 
expertise. In the realm of cognitive feelings, Ofir (2000) observed that feelings of ease-of-
retrieval have stronger influence on judgments among individuals with low expertise in the 
judgment’s domain than among individuals with high expertise. In this study, two groups of 
participants, auto mechanics (experts) and mere holders of driver’s licenses (laymen), were 
asked to generate either few or many causes for car breakdowns, and then to estimate the 
frequency of car breakdowns. As expected, whereas the frequency judgments of laymen 
were influenced by feelings of ease-of-retrieval, those of experts were not (see also Florack 
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& Zoabi, 2003). This is presumably because experts find their feelings to be relatively less 
relevant given that they can also tap into their factual knowledge as a basis for judgment.  
Extending these findings, Tybout, Sternthal, Malaviya, Bakamitsos, and Park (2005) 
suggest that the reliance on feelings of ease-of-retrieval is highest under moderate levels of 
expertise and lower under either low or high levels of expertise. This is because the ease of 
retrieval experienced by experts and the difficulty of retrieval experienced by novices both 
seem uninformative and therefore irrelevant for the judgment. In contrast, ease or difficulty 
experiences under medium levels of expertise are informative and hence perceived to be 
relevant. Although these findings seem to conflict with Ofir’s (2000) and Florack and Zoabi’s 
(2003) conclusions that reliance on cognitive feelings is stronger under low levels of 
expertise, this apparent inconsistency may be due to differences in definitions of what 
constitutes low versus medium levels of expertise across studies. Close inspection of these 
studies’ methodologies seems to suggest that the medium level of expertise in Tybout and 
colleagues’ (2005) studies was comparable to the low level of expertise in the earlier studies, 
which would reconcile the conflicting sets of results. 
The perceived relevance of cognitive feelings also depends on the person’s trait 
affect. Extending Ruder and Bless’ (2003) findings from the domain of momentarily induced 
mood states to the domain of chronic trait-level affect, Greifeneder and Bless (2008) 
observed an effect of ease-of-retrieval experiences on judgments among non-depressed 
individuals, but not among depressed individuals (as determined using the Allgemeine-
Depressions-Skala or the Beck-Depression-Inventory; Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993; Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961, respectively). As for momentary affective states 
(Ruder & Bless, 2003), this finding is likely due to depression decreasing the perceived 
relevance of cognitive feelings of ease or difficulty.  
Furthermore, the perceived relevance of cognitive feelings is a function of the 
person’s faith in intuition, which is his or her chronic tendency to rely on intuition (Epstein, 
Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). Keller and Bless (2008) hypothesized and found that high 
levels of faith in intuition were associated with greater reliance on cognitive feelings as 
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information compared to low levels of faith in intuition (groups divided based on Faith in 
Intuition scale; Epstein et al., 1996). This is presumably because compared to those with low 
faith in intuition, individuals with high faith in intuition have greater trust in their experiential 
reactions and therefore perceive their feelings to be more relevant when forming judgments.  
Finally, also consistent with the notion of disposition-related relevance, Weick and 
Guinote (2008) observed that judgments of powerful individuals exhibited stronger reliance 
on ease-of-retrieval experiences than judgments of non-powerful individuals. According to 
the authors, this is because powerful individuals feel free to make judgments based on 
subjective information, including feelings, whereas individuals with less power feel a need to 
pay attention to multiple cues to increase control (Guinote, 2007). 
Conclusion 
The diverse set of findings reviewed in this section suggests that feelings are relied 
upon more when they are perceived to be relevant for the judgment than when they are 
perceived to be less relevant. This relevance may stem from a variety of sources that can be 
grouped into two broad categories: those related to the context of judgment formation, and 
those related to the person forming the judgment. Again, a high degree of parallelism was 
observed between the domain of affective feelings and the domain of cognitive feelings. 
Paralleling our conclusion on representativeness, it is noteworthy that the evidence 
about the effects of relevance is difficult to reconcile with mere automatic spreading 
activation as postulated in the priming-account. This is because mere spreading activation 
should not be responsive to the feelings’ perceived materiality for the judgment. Yet, the 
findings reviewed here demonstrate an enormous impact of relevance, thus supporting the 
FI-perspective.  
Looking at both representativeness (previous section) and relevance, it is instructive 
to note the surprising variety of variables with which both principles have been 
operationalized. This diversity of operationalizations attests to the importance of 
representativeness and relevance as general moderators of the reliance on feelings. This 
diversity further suggests that the reliance on feelings as information in judgment is a rather 
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flexible process (Pham, 2004), which may not be readily apparent when examining individual 
studies in isolation, but becomes very apparent when considering all these studies together. 
Finally, this diversity allows for the conclusion that the metacognitive assessments of 
representativeness and relevance are well-tuned processes that take into account a host of 
external and internal information, including their interrelation, before a specific feeling is used 
in a given judgment. 
While the metacognitive assessments of representativeness and relevance share the 
above characteristics of flexibility and efficiency, they appear to differ with respect to their 
assumed default value. For representativeness, it has been suggested that the default value 
is “yes”: that is, feelings are assumed to be representative unless there is evidence to the 
contrary. Because feelings are generally experienced in close temporal contiguity with the 
objects that elicit them, people tend to assume that their feelings arise from (i.e. “represent”) 
whatever happens to be the focus of their attention (immediacy principle, Clore, Wyer et al., 
2001; aboutness principle, Higgins, 1996). Only if there is doubt is the default assessment 
converted to “unrepresentative.” In contrast, it appears that there is no strict default for 
relevance. Rather, relevance seems to be assessed very flexibly, depending on various 
external and inner conditions, as reviewed above (see also Pham, 2008). 
Evaluative malleability of judgments 
The fourth category of moderators comprises a large body of empirical evidence 
indicating that feelings exert a stronger influence on judgments that are evaluatively 
malleable. That is, the link between feelings and judgments is stronger when judgments are 
more open to extraneous influences. Returning to the politician example, evaluative 
malleability refers to the degree to which judgments of trustworthiness are changeable. 
Variations in evaluative malleability can be of two types. First, differences in malleability may 
stem from differences across judgment dimensions: some kinds of judgments are more 
evaluatively malleable than others (judgment-related malleability). For instance, judgments of 
trustworthiness are presumably more malleable than judgments about gender. Second, 
differences in malleability may stem from differences across targets: judgments about certain 
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targets are more open to extraneous influences than those about other targets (target-related 
malleability). For instance, judgments about the trustworthiness of Politician A may be more 
influenced by feelings than judgments about the trustworthiness of Politician B. Table 4 
provides a concise overview.  
The notion of evaluative malleability parallels theorizing about the notion of judgment 
construction. Fiedler (1991), among others, suggested that feelings are more likely to have 
an impact on judgments (a) if no prior judgment has been stored in memory or is readily 
accessible, and (b) if the judgmental domain is rather unstructured, novel, ambiguous, or 
general, all of which require online judgment construction. A similar perspective can be found 
in the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995a), which draws a distinction between constructive 
judgment strategies that are open to the infusion of contextual affect, and nonconstructive 
judgment strategies that reduce the likelihood of affect infusion. Although not necessarily 
implied, the degree of judgment construction may be perceived as depending on the intensity 
of processing, which has separate effects on the reliance on feelings in judgment (as shall be 
discussed further). To avoid such a confound and to underscore that the following section 
pertains to aspects of the judgment itself, we prefer the label evaluative malleability.  
Judgment-related malleability 
Several lines of research suggest that some judgments are more evaluatively 
malleable than others and therefore more influenced by affective feelings. It has been found, 
for instance, that judgments of general life satisfaction are more influenced by incidental 
affective feelings than judgments of satisfaction with specific life domains (Schwarz, Strack, 
Kommer, & Wagner, 1987). Presumably this is because the judgment criteria for assessing 
one’s general life satisfaction are less well-defined; and as a result, such general judgments 
may be influenced by more diverse sources of information, including affective feelings. In 
contrast, the criteria for assessing one’s satisfaction with more specific life domains such as 
work are better defined (e.g., salary, rank), making such specific judgments less malleable 
and therefore less open to the influence of feelings (for conceptually similar evidence, see 
Gorn et al., 1993). 
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Replicating these findings with inter-individual judgments, Forgas (1990) observed 
that the influence of incidental mood states is more pronounced for global evaluative 
judgments (e.g., likeable, dislikeable) than for more specific judgments (e.g., intelligent-dull). 
Similarly, Sedikides (1995) found that peripheral self-conceptions were more influenced by 
affective feelings than central self-conceptions. This is presumably because peripheral self-
conceptions are “relatively low in personal descriptiveness” (p. 760) and less important to the 
self, and therefore more malleable, whereas central self-conceptions are “relatively high in 
personal descriptiveness” (p. 760) and more important to the self, and therefore less 
malleable. In a related vein, Forgas and Tehani (2005) observed that when giving 
performance feedback to someone, staff members were more influenced by their incidental 
mood states than managers. This is presumably because staff members, unlike managers, 
did not have well-established scripts for giving performance feedback, making their 
judgments more malleable to extraneous influences.  
In the domain of cognitive feelings, Dijksterhuis, Macrae, and Haddock (1999) 
hypothesized that the influence of feelings of ease-of-retrieval on judgments would depend 
on the extremity of prior attitudes. Participants were asked to generate either few or many 
traits on which men and women differ. They were then asked to imagine a female secretary 
and to describe her. The stereotypicality of these portrayals was then rated. Participants 
were categorized as low-prejudiced, medium-prejudiced, and high-prejudiced individuals 
based on their responses to the Modern Sexism Scale (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). 
The results show that the secretary portrayals offered by low-prejudiced individuals were the 
most affected by experiences of ease-of-retrieval. According to the authors, this is because 
low-prejudiced individuals were more likely to construct judgments online, whereas medium- 
or high-prejudiced individuals were more likely to recruit previously formed attitudes. The 
judgments by low-prejudiced individuals were therefore more malleable and open to 
extraneous influences such as cognitive feelings.  
Relatedly, Haddock, Rothman, Reber, and Schwarz (1999, Exp. 1) reported that only 
judgments from participants with moderate attitudes toward doctor-assisted suicide were 
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influenced by ease-of-retrieval experiences; judgments from participants with more extreme 
attitudes were not. Again, this finding may be interpreted in terms of differences in 
malleability. Participants with moderate attitudes presumably formed their judgments online, 
whereas those with more extreme attitudes presumably recruited their previously formed 
attitudes. As a result, the judgments of participants with moderate as opposed to extreme 
attitudes were more malleable and open to the influence of cognitive feelings. 
Target-related malleability 
Apart from differences across judgments, malleability may also stem from differences 
across targets: judgments may be more evaluatively malleable for some targets than for 
others. In one of the earliest demonstrations of this principle, Isen and Shalker (1982) found 
that incidental mood states had greater mood-congruent influence on the ratings of slides 
that were affectively neutral than on the ratings of slides that were either affectively positive 
or negative. The authors reasoned that the stronger effect of mood states on neutral slides 
was due to the fact that neutral slides could be viewed as either positive or negative (i.e., 
were evaluatively ambiguous). Similarly, Gorn, Pham, and Sin (2001) observed that transient 
mood states influenced the evaluation of an ad if the ad was affectively ambiguous, but not if 
the ad had a clearly pleasant affective tone. Presumably this is because judgments about 
affectively ambiguous ads are more evaluatively malleable (for conceptually similar evidence, 
Miniard, Bhatla, & Sirdeshmukh, 1992).  
In a different domain, Salovey and Birnbaum (1989, Exp. 3) reported more 
pronounced effects of manipulated mood on negative health events (e.g., contracting some 
sort of cancer) than on positive health events (e.g., being in great physical shape). This is 
presumably because people are less familiar with negative health events than with positive 
health events, making judgments of the former relatively more malleable. Relatedly, Forgas 
and Moylan (1991) observed that incidental affective states had stronger influence on 
evaluations of a partner of another race than on evaluations of a partner of the same race. 
This is presumably because compared to same-race individuals, other-race individuals are 
more atypical and less familiar, making their evaluation more malleable. Subsequent studies 
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conceptually replicated these findings, further substantiating the notion that target atypicality 
increases the impact of affective feelings on judgment (Forgas, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 
1995b).4 
While the malleability of the target in the above findings came mainly from its 
evaluative ambiguity, ambiguity may also arise as a function of the amount of information 
provided about the target. For instance, Bakamitsos (2006, Exp. 1) observed that incidental 
mood states have stronger mood-congruent influences on product evaluations when no 
information about the product’s attributes is provided than when clear information is provided. 
Presumably this is because the absence of attribute information produces ambiguity and 
therefore evaluative malleability, allowing for a more pronounced impact of feelings in 
judgments. Similarly, Fedorikhin and Cole (2004, Exp. 2) observed that incidental mood 
states exerted more influence on product choices when no additional information was 
provided than when consensus information from prior evaluations was provided. Again, this 
moderation can be attributed to differences in ambiguity, with the target products being more 
ambiguous and hence evaluatively more malleable when no consensus information is given. 
Consistent with this ambiguity interpretation, the authors further reported that mood states 
influenced consumer choices more when two conflicting pieces of product information were 
presented without any indication about their relative importance (Fedorikhin & Cole, 2004, 
Exp. 3). When participants were told which of the two pieces of conflicting information to 
focus on, thus reducing ambiguity, the influence of feelings on choice was less pronounced. 
Also pertaining to target-related malleability, though operationalized via a dispositional 
variable, Srull (1987, Exp. 3) reported that evaluations formed by novices as compared to 
experts were more influenced by transient mood states. Presumably this is because experts 
are more knowledgeable in the respective domain, which reduces the evaluative ambiguity of 
targets and renders judgments less malleable to extraneous influences such as incidental 
affective feelings.  
Finally, target-related malleability is also a function of whether the target has been 
evaluated previously. A judgment is more likely to be open to extraneous influences when no 
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prior evaluation of the same target has been formed. For instance, Srull (1987, Exp. 2) 
presented participants an ad for a car with various pieces of attribute information. 
Participants were asked to either form an evaluation online or simply absorb the presented 
information. Twenty-four hours later, participants were induced into a positive or negative 
mood and asked to form an evaluation of the car again, this time without the ad. It was found 
that mood influenced evaluations only for participants who were previously asked to absorb 
the information. For participants who were initially told to evaluate the car, no reliable 
influence of mood on judgments was detected. Apparently, prior evaluations made 
judgments about the car less malleable and less open to the influence of incidental affective 
feelings (for conceptually similar results, see Fedorikhin & Cole, 2004, Exp. 1; Yeung & 
Wyer, 2004; 2005, Exp. 2).  
Conclusion 
A substantial set of findings indicate that another important moderator of the influence 
of feelings on judgment is the evaluative malleability of the judgment: feelings exert stronger 
influences when judgments are evaluatively malleable. The fact that similar effects have 
been observed with many different forms of malleability—resulting from variation across 
judgments and targets—strongly supports this principle. To date, the evidence supporting 
this principle is more extensive in the domain of affective feelings than in the domain of 
cognitive feelings.  
We recognize that some of the findings reviewed here could potentially be subsumed 
under one of the preceding three moderator categories. For instance, the finding that 
transient mood states had stronger influence on the evaluation of an ad if the ad was 
affectively ambiguous than if the ad had a clearly pleasant affective tone (Gorn et al., 2001) 
were interpreted here as consistent with the principle of evaluative malleability. However, one 
could alternatively argue that participants’ mood states were relatively more salient when the 
ad was affectively neutral than when the ad itself was clearly pleasant. This finding could 
thus also be seen as a manifestation of the salience principle. Similarly, consider the finding 
that the impact of mood states is more pronounced for judgments of general life satisfaction 
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than for judgments about specific life domains (Schwarz et al., 1987). Although we interpret 
this finding as consistent with the principle of evaluative malleability, one may alternatively 
see it as supporting the principle of relevance: transient mood states may be perceived to be 
more relevant when judging one’s general life satisfaction than when judging one’s 
satisfaction with specific life domains. Unfortunately, the evidence available to date does not 
allow a definite disentangling of these alternative interpretations. In such cases, we therefore 
elected to use the categorization that best matched the explanation originally provided by the 
authors. Nevertheless, even if some of the findings reported in this section may be better 
categorized under a different section, we believe that evaluative malleability should be seen 
as a conceptually distinct moderator, because evaluative malleability may vary even if 
salience, representativeness, and relevance are held constant (see also Fiedler, 1991). 
Processing intensity 
A fifth and final category of findings indicates that the reliance on affective and 
cognitive feelings in judgment is moderated by the individual’s processing intensity. While 
there is ample evidence that the processing intensity that characterizes a judgment often 
alters the degree to which people rely on their feelings, authors differ in terms of how to 
interpret such findings. Some have suggested that the moderating effects of processing 
intensity can be best understood in terms of one (or more) of the principles already identified 
in this review—salience, representativeness, relevance, and malleability. For example, it has 
been proposed that processing intensity influences whether an incidental affective or 
cognitive feeling is salient, perceived to be representative (e.g., Albarracín & Kumkale, 
2003), or perceived to be relevant (Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). Other authors have 
suggested that processing intensity exerts a direct effect on the reliance on feelings, 
independently of these other principles. For example, it has been suggested that lower 
processing intensity inherently encourages the reliance on feelings by precluding the 
systematic integration of message-induced beliefs (e.g., Albarracín & Wyer, 2001). Because 
in many cases the absence of adequate process data does not allow for a clear 
disentangling between these contrasting views, we elected to review all findings pertaining to 
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the moderating effects of processing intensity under a separate moderator category. While 
we recognize that some of these findings may also reflect the operation of other moderators 
identified previously, we will emphasize the unique contribution that processing intensity may 
have over and above the other moderators, as general processing background. Processing 
intensity is therefore treated as a separate functional category (as opposed to an 
operationalization of one of the other four moderator categories).  
The findings reviewed in what follows can be organized into two conceptually related 
sub-groups: motivation and opportunity. Again, the results are discussed jointly for affective 
and cognitive feelings. A concise overview is provided in Table 5.  
Processing motivation 
A number of studies indicate that the reliance on affective feelings as information in 
judgment is stronger when the person’s processing motivation is low. For instance, in one 
study (Batra & Stayman, 1990), participants in a positive or neutral mood state were shown 
an ad for a bank, and asked to report their attitude toward the bank. Results revealed a 
strong effect of mood on attitudes among participants low in need for cognition, but not 
among participants high in need for cognition, as assessed by the Need for Cognition Scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Similarly, Petty, Schumann, Richman, and Strathman (1993, 
Exp. 1) reported a direct effect of feelings as information on judgments only for participants 
low in need for cognition. Among participants high in need for cognition, the effects of 
incidental feelings were mediated by participants’ thoughts, consistent with a priming-
account.  
In an extension of these quasi-experimental findings, Petty and colleagues (1993, 
Exp. 2) manipulated processing motivation experimentally by varying personal relevance. 
Participants were shown several commercials and subsequently asked to evaluate one of the 
advertised products: a pen. To create different levels of processing motivation, participants in 
the high personal relevance condition were told that at the end of the session, as a gift, they 
would get to choose a pen that was available in their region; in contrast, participants in the 
low personal relevance condition were told that the gift was instant coffee that was not 
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available in their region. Results again indicate that feelings were used as information in 
forming attitudes under conditions of low processing motivation (for conceptually similar 
results, see Bosmans & Baumgartner, 2005, Exp. 2; Isbell & Wyer, 1999).  
Extending these findings, Albarracín and Kumkale (2003) reported mood effects on 
judgments only for conditions of moderate processing intensity, that is, when either intrinsic 
motivation or processing opportunity were low. When both were low or both were high, no 
mood effects on judgments were observed. The authors explain this curvilinear relationship 
between processing intensity and reliance on feelings by differentiating the influence of 
motivation on two separate underlying processes. First, to be used as information, feelings 
need to be identified. According to Albarracín and Kumkale, this identification is more likely 
under higher processing intensity (consistent with the principle of salience). Second, once 
identified, feelings also have to be perceived as representative to be used as information in 
judgment. When the real source of the feelings is incidental, higher levels of processing 
intensity increase the chance that the feelings will be seen as not representative, and 
therefore will not be used in the judgment (consistent with the principle of 
representativeness). These separate effects of processing intensity on feeling identification 
and assessment of representativeness combine into the observed curvilinear relationship 
between processing intensity and reliance on incidental affective feelings in judgment. Note, 
however, that once the likelihood of identification of the feelings is controlled for, the net 
effect of processing intensity on the perceived representativeness of incidental feelings—and 
the reliance on these feelings—is negative, which is consistent with the theorizing and 
findings reviewed above (e.g., Isbell & Wyer, 1999). A possible reason why earlier studies 
only found a negative effect of processing intensity on the reliance on feelings, whereas 
Albarracín and Kumkale (2003) found a curvilinear effect, is that levels of processing 
intensity considered low in these earlier studies were nevertheless sufficient for feelings to be 
identified. Taken together, these findings converge in suggesting that, everything else being 
equal, affective feelings are more likely to be used as information in judgment formation 
when processing motivation is low.  
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Whereas the pattern of results regarding the moderating effects of processing 
motivation on the reliance on affective feelings is consistent, the evidence with respect to 
cognitive feelings is rather mixed. Consistent with the findings typically observed for affective 
feelings, one line of research suggests that feelings of ease-of-retrieval are more likely to 
influence judgments under conditions of low processing motivation. In this line of research, it 
is generally assumed that feelings of ease or difficulty are perceived to be indicative of the 
quantity of the retrieved content (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Given that heuristic cues 
such as the quantity of content information are more important under conditions of heuristic 
processing (e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999), the influence of feelings should be strongest when 
processing motivation is low. Results consistent with this reasoning have been obtained with 
different methodological operationalizations. For instance, Rothman and Schwarz (1998) 
varied personal relevance by assessing individuals’ family history of heart disease and by 
framing the retrieval task as either about the self or about the average person. The authors 
predicted that both a family history of heart disease and a focus on the self would increase 
processing motivation and therefore decrease the reliance on cognitive feelings. In line with 
this prediction, feelings of ease-of-retrieval influenced perceptions of vulnerability to heart 
disease when processing motivation was low, but not when it was high (for conceptually 
similar evidence, see Grayson & Schwarz, 1999).  
Haddock (2002) manipulated the ease-of-retrieval of reasons to like or dislike Tony 
Blair before assessing participants’ attitudes toward him. Processing motivation was 
operationalized by classifying participants based on their personal interest in British politics. 
Again, ease-of-retrieval effects were stronger among participants with low processing 
motivation than among those with high processing motivation. Relatedly, Florack and Zoabi 
(2003) measured need for cognition and found that only participants low in need for cognition 
relied on their feelings as information. Finally, Broemer (2004, Exp. 3) manipulated personal 
relevance experimentally by asking participants to think about either trivial (low relevance) or 
serious disease symptoms (high relevance). Again, cognitive feelings of ease or difficulty 
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influenced judgments only when personal relevance was low (see also Greifeneder, 2007, 
Exp. 2).  
The above evidence mainly capitalized on different levels of personal relevance. 
Another way to influence processing motivation is to vary the motivation for accuracy. Aarts 
and Dijksterhuis (1999, Exp. 2) asked bicycle owners to list few versus many destinations 
that they used their bicycles to travel to. Participants were then asked to estimate their 
frequency of bicycle use. To vary accuracy motivations, participants were asked to provide 
either an exact estimate or a rough estimate. As predicted, only the participants with low 
accuracy motivation were influenced by their ease-of-retrieval feelings in their frequency 
estimates (for similar evidence, see Greifeneder, 2007, Exp. 1). 
Finally, a more indirect way of influencing processing motivation is through 
uncertainty. Given that individuals are generally motivated to reduce uncertainty (e.g., Van 
den Bos & Lind, 2002), one can hypothesize that conditions of uncertainty should increase 
individuals’ processing motivation, and therefore decrease individuals’ reliance on feelings in 
judgment. Consistent with this theorizing, a series of studies revealed that feelings of ease-
of-retrieval influenced judgments and behaviors under conditions of certainty, but not under 
conditions of uncertainty (Greifeneder, Müller, Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless, 2009a, 
2009b; Müller, Greifeneder, Stahlberg, Van den Bos, & Bless, 2010). 
In contrast, a second line of work suggests that ease-of-retrieval experiences are 
more likely to influence judgments under conditions of high processing motivation. In this line 
of work, it is generally assumed that feelings of ease or difficulty are perceived to be 
indicative of the quality of or the confidence in the retrieved content; that is, the feelings 
serve as information that qualifies the retrieved content information. Note that in this line of 
work, the influence of feelings of ease or difficulty is not due to thought-priming, but to 
feelings serving as information about thought content. Given that the quality of content 
information is generally believed to be important under conditions of systematic processing 
(e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999), this influence of feelings should be stronger when processing 
motivation is high. Consistent with this reasoning, Wänke and Bless (2000) observed that 
 When feelings are used as information      - 44 - 
experiences of ease-of-retrieval of positive aspects led to more positive evaluations under 
conditions of high motivation than under conditions of low motivation, operationalized via 
need for cognition or by instructing participants to report accurate (high motivation) versus 
spontaneous reactions (low motivation). Tormala and colleagues (2002) also examined how 
processing motivation moderates the influence of ease-of-retrieval experiences in the context 
of attitudes toward a new exam policy. In one study, processing motivation was 
operationalized by assessing participants’ need for cognition. In another study, it was 
manipulated by varying the personal relevance of the target and participants’ accountability 
for their judgments. In both studies, ease-of-retrieval experiences influenced the evaluation 
of the exam policy in conditions of high but not low processing motivation. Relatedly, Hirt, 
Kardes, and Markman (2004) observed more reliance on cognitive feelings as information 
among participants with high need for structure (measured via the Need for Structure Scale; 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) than among those with low need for structure.  
In summary, conditions of both low and high processing motivation have been found 
to amplify or reduce the impact of ease-of-retrieval experiences on judgments. To date, this 
inconsistency in findings has not been resolved. However, we speculate that the key to 
reconciling the two conflicting sets of results resides in participants’ spontaneous inferences 
about what an easy or difficult recall of information means. Indeed, what differentiates the 
two process perspectives is whether participants use their feelings as an indication of the 
quantity of, or an indication of the confidence in, the recalled content information (see also 
Greifeneder & Bless, 2007). We suspect that some aspects of the judgment task may 
encourage one type of inference over the other. For example, if the judgment is about 
estimating the frequency of one’s bicycle use (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999), feelings of ease or 
difficulty are more likely to be interpreted as indicative of the frequency of instances than as 
indicative of confidence in these instances. Conversely, if the judgment is about a new exam 
policy after retrieving supporting arguments (Tormala et al., 2002), feelings of ease or 
difficulty may be more likely to be interpreted as indicative of the confidence in these 
arguments than their frequency. We leave it to future research to corroborate these 
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speculations. Interestingly, these differences in interpretation may also explain why 
processing motivation is the only variable for which a differential pattern of moderating 
evidence for affective versus cognitive feelings was observed. As mentioned previously, 
interpretations of cognitive feelings may be less determined and more flexible than 
interpretations of affective feelings. Consequently, cognitive feelings may be interpreted in 
ways that matter in different processing contexts, whereas affective feelings seem to matter 
primarily in one processing context, low processing motivation. Once cognitive feelings are 
also interpreted in a way that matters when processing motivation is low, however, the 
pattern of findings for affective and cognitive feelings is parallel. 
Processing opportunity 
The evidence accrued for processing opportunity uniformly holds that affective and 
cognitive feelings are more likely to influence judgments when processing opportunity is low. 
For instance, Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) asked participants induced into a happy or sad 
mood state to respond to a large number of satisfaction items. The authors operationalized 
different levels of processing opportunity through four combinations of time pressure and 
task competition. One quarter of the items were presented with neither time pressure nor 
competing task; one quarter with no time pressure and a competing task (remembering a 5-
digit number); one quarter with time pressure and no competing task; and the final quarter 
with both time pressure and competing task demands. The results exhibited a clear linear 
trend showing that the impact of mood states on satisfaction judgments decreased with 
higher levels of processing opportunity. The strongest impact of affective feelings on 
judgments was observed when there was both time pressure and competing task demands 
(lowest processing opportunity); the smallest impact was observed when there was neither 
time pressure nor competing task (highest processing opportunity).  
Similar findings have been observed with affective feelings that are integral to the 
object of judgment. For example, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) manipulated integral affective 
responses by offering participants a choice between a chocolate cake eliciting strong positive 
affective reactions, and a fruit salad eliciting weaker positive affective reactions. They 
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manipulated processing opportunity by varying participants’ cognitive loads. Results revealed 
a stronger preference for the cake under conditions of high cognitive load (low processing 
opportunity) than under conditions of low cognitive load (high processing opportunity), again 
suggesting that the impact of affective feelings is stronger when processing opportunity is 
low (see also Shiv & Fedorikhin, 2002; for related evidence, see Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & 
Hughes, 2001, Exp. 3).  
Taking a different methodological approach, Rottenstreich, Sood, and Brenner (2007) 
manipulated processing opportunity by either asking participants to indicate their preference 
with respect to options they had previously seen (memory-based choice), or by showing 
participants the options presented previously and then asking them to choose (stimulus-
based choice). Because recalling options from memory and retaining them in working 
memory is presumably more taxing than reading about the options, a memory-based choice 
should involve lower processing opportunity than a stimulus-based choice. Consistent with 
this reasoning, integral affective feelings exerted a stronger impact in the memory-based 
condition than in the stimulus-based condition, presumably as a result of a different 
processing opportunity across conditions. 
Albarracín and Wyer (2001) induced participants into a positive or negative mood 
state and manipulated participants’ processing opportunity by means of a background noise, 
which was either not distracting (high processing opportunity) or distracting (low processing 
opportunity). Participants were then presented with a persuasive message and asked to 
report their attitudes after reading the message. Paralleling other findings, analyses revealed 
that affective feelings were more likely to be used as information under conditions of low 
processing opportunity (see also Albarracín & Kumkale, 2003). According to the authors, this 
is because low-opportunity participants relied on their subjective affective feelings toward the 
target as they were unable to integrate their message-induced beliefs into a summary 
attitude. In contrast, under conditions of high processing opportunity, judgments were 
influenced by argument strength and were unrelated to affective feelings.  
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Conceptually similar results have been reported in the realm of cognitive feelings by 
Greifeneder and Bless (2007), who observed that experiences of ease or difficulty have 
stronger influences on judgments under conditions of low processing opportunity than under 
conditions of high processing opportunity. In addition to measuring the effects of ease-of-
retrieval on judgments, Greifeneder and Bless also assessed the processing latencies 
associated with the judgments to shed more light on the underlying processes. Assuming 
that cognitive feelings are single pieces of information (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999), one 
would expect that it would take similar amounts of time to form a judgment based on feelings 
of ease or on feelings of difficulty. However, judgments based on the content of recalled 
information should take longer when more pieces of information need to be integrated. The 
authors therefore predicted that judgments under conditions of low opportunity would exhibit 
similar latencies regardless of the number of items that had to be retrieved, whereas 
judgments under conditions of high opportunity would exhibit longer latencies when more 
items had to be retrieved. Results were in line with this prediction, supporting the claim that 
individuals are likely to rely on their feelings of ease-of-retrieval as information under 
conditions of low opportunity (for a conceptually related finding, see Ruder & Bless, 2003).  
Conclusion 
A large number of studies, across a variety of methods and a variety of judgment 
domains, indicate that both the use of affective feelings and the use of cognitive feelings in 
judgment are moderated by processing intensity. The large majority of these findings indicate 
that the reliance on feelings is more likely when processing intensity, whether motivation-
based or processing-opportunity-based, is low.  
While processing intensity was discussed as a separate moderator category, it 
appears that it operates both as a primary moderator (parallel to the other four moderators), 
and as a secondary moderator, whose influence is mediated by one of the other moderators. 
While the available evidence on underlying processes is insufficient to decide which 
mechanisms were operating in which instance, this situation allows for one important 
conclusion: although this review treats the five moderator categories as parallel, it is possible 
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that the moderators operate at different levels. Future research may resolve this question by 
assessing not only the final judgments, but also process information pertaining to salience, 
representativeness, relevance, and malleability. 
General conclusions on moderators of the reliance on feelings 
The main objective of this paper was to provide an integrative review of factors that 
moderate the reliance on both affective and cognitive feelings in judgment. Five major 
categories of moderators were identified, with subcategories of conceptually similar findings 
within each main category. Five major conclusions can be drawn from the reviewed 
evidence. First, feelings exert a stronger influence on judgments when exceeding a certain 
threshold of salience. Second, feelings exert a stronger influence on judgments when 
perceived as representative of the target. Third, feelings exert a stronger influence on 
judgments when perceived as relevant for the judgment. Fourth, feelings exert a stronger 
influence on judgments when these judgments are evaluatively malleable. And finally, 
feelings generally exert a stronger influence on judgments under conditions of low 
processing intensity.  
It was additionally found that both the structure of the moderators and the observed 
patterns of results were remarkably similar for affective and cognitive feelings, suggesting 
that the determinants of reliance on affective versus cognitive feeling are largely parallel. 
From this parallelism, one may infer that the processes underlying the influence of affective 
versus cognitive feelings are probably closely related, if not common. However, caution is 
needed before accepting this conclusion, as it is based only on a “paramorphic” similarity of 
outcome contingencies, rather than on direct evidence of isomorphic equivalence. This 
conclusion should thus be seen as only tentative. Still, given the high degree of similarity of 
contingencies between affective and cognitive subjective feelings, it seems likely that the two 
types of feelings operate through the same set of mechanisms. This proposition would be 
consistent with a series of theoretical accounts that strongly argue for the unity of affective 
and cognitive feelings (e.g., Bless & Forgas, 2000; Clore, 1992; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999; 
Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Strack, 1992). Intriguingly, the high level of similarity between 
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affective and cognitive feelings raises the possibility that there may be a single system of 
feeling-based judgment, which may also handle bodily feelings. This feeling-based system 
would be characterized by the operation of the five sets of moderators reviewed in this 
contribution, which collectively determine when feelings are used as information.  
It should be noted, however, that this review focused on evidence pertaining to one 
type of affective feeling—subtle incidental or integral affective experiences—and one type of 
cognitive feeling—subtle experiences of ease-of-retrieval. This focus reflects the fact that the 
literature on moderators of the reliance on feelings has largely focused on these two 
particular kinds of feelings, for various theoretical and methodological reasons. Yet, in line 
with theorizing suggesting that different feelings share important characteristics that make 
them operate in a similar fashion (e.g., Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), we suspect that 
the primary conclusions of this review can be extended to other kinds of affective and 
cognitive feelings that share the same structural characteristics. Should other affective or 
cognitive feelings be structurally different from the ones reviewed here, their moderators 
could be different. However, one could alternatively hypothesize that even if other feelings 
are quite different from those reviewed here, the fundamental principles that govern their 
operations may remain the same. Take, for instance, the case of emotions, which unlike 
subtle mood states, have clear referents or causes (e.g., Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). If 
emotions are found not to influence unrelated target judgments, it may be precisely because 
emotions, with their clear referents, are more likely to be perceived as unrepresentative of 
unrelated targets. Therefore, the degree to which different moderating factors identified in 
this review apply to different affective and cognitive feelings could simply be a function of the 
degree to which these other feelings share the characteristics of the feelings addressed in 
this review. The fact that subtle affective feelings and feelings of ease-of-retrieval may be 
particularly prone to being used as information, may thus have enabled us to identify the 
broader parameters of the general reliance on feelings in judgment.  
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Theoretical conjectures on the ecology of feelings-as-information 
Given that the empirical evidence reviewed here leaves little doubt that feelings can 
be used as information in judgments, it is important to examine the implications of this 
phenomenon beyond the confines of laboratory settings. To address this issue, we first 
speculate on whether the reliance on feelings in everyday life is likely to be ubiquitous or 
rather uncommon. We then speculate on why individuals often appear unaware of the 
frequency with which they rely on their feelings in judgment. We end with conjectures on why 
the reliance on feelings in judgment may be generally valid rather than error-prone.  
Feelings are frequently used as information 
As a starting point, it seems reasonable to assume that feelings are always 
accessible (though not necessarily always salient). This assumption stems from the notion 
that affective and cognitive feelings are activated automatically and are constant by-products 
of human functioning. For instance, Whittlesea and Leboe (2000) argued that information 
processing is constantly monitored and reflected in fluency. Similarly, many authors have 
argued that affective feelings are often instantiated immediately upon exposure to a target 
(e.g., Pham et al., 2001; Zajonc, 1980).  
Assuming that feelings are always accessible, the next question pertains to when 
they will be used as information. The evidence reviewed in this article suggests that feelings 
are more likely to be used as information when processing intensity is low. Given that 
processing intensity is generally low in daily life (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Krugman, 1965), 
feelings may be expected to influence judgments frequently. In fact, feelings may influence 
judgments relatively more frequently than the systematic integration of content information 
does. Consider activities such as doing groceries, commuting to work, deciding about lunch, 
or watching TV: like most activities of daily life, these are generally characterized by a lack of 
processing intensity, which should foster the reliance on feelings as a basis for judgment. But 
even if processing motivation and capacity are relatively high, they may still be insufficient 
when judgments are very complex, such as when the number of decision alternatives is very 
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large, thereby encouraging the reliance on feelings as a way of dealing with this complexity. 
Other research and theoretical analyses support the conclusion that affective and cognitive 
feelings are relied upon frequently in daily life. First, the sheer variety of judgments that have 
been shown to be influenced by feelings suggests that feelings must exert pervasive 
influences on judgments (e.g., Pham, 2008; Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
Moreover, it has been shown that the conscious monitoring of affective feelings provides 
particularly fast assessments that are likely to be primary—and therefore more frequently 
used—in judgment (Pham et al., 2001; see also Verplanken, Hofstee, & Janssen, 1998).  
From the accumulated evidence, it seems reasonable to conclude that feelings exert 
ubiquitous informational influences on judgments in daily life—influences that are more 
pervasive than is generally assumed. The pervasiveness of these influences renders the 
notion of a computational person—who relies solely on content information and ignores 
feelings—anachronistic. This suggests that conceptions of individual decision making both 
within and outside psychological research should be updated. Moreover, the present 
conclusion challenges the theoretical view that the direct use of feelings in judgment—as 
compared to the influence of feelings on judgment via thought or content priming—is a 
phenomenon confined to “limited circumstances” (Forgas, 1995b, p. 762; see also Fishbein & 
Middlestadt, 1995). The synthesis of empirical evidence offered here demonstrates that the 
direct use of feelings as information in judgment is a very—and possibly even the more—
common phenomenon. 
Why people are often unaware of the influence of feelings 
If one accepts that feelings frequently influence judgments, why are individuals often 
unaware of this influence? Put differently, why might the above conclusion be surprising to 
many individuals, especially in western societies, which generally value rational thought? 
One reason may be that individuals are often unaware of the processes that underlie the 
reliance on feelings in judgment (e.g., Menon & Raghubir, 2003).  
A second reason may be that the judgment implications of content information and 
the judgment implications of feelings are often aligned, depriving individuals of diagnostic 
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feedback. Consider one of the original studies on the ease-of-retrieval phenomenon (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973, Exp. 3). Participants were asked to estimate the relative frequency of 
English words beginning with the letter “r” as compared to the frequency of words having the 
letter “r” in the third position. Participants generally judged words beginning with the letter “r” 
to be more frequent, presumably because it felt easier to retrieve words from this category. 
Intriguingly, however, if participants actually tried to find instances of the respective word 
categories, they would likely come up with more words beginning with the letter “r” than 
words having the letter “r” in the third position. In this case, then, implications drawn from 
feelings and implications drawn from content information would be aligned, and judgments 
would not be diagnostic about the inputs they are based on. As this is presumably a common 
situation outside laboratory settings, people may often have the impression that they are 
relying on content even when, in fact, they are relying on feelings (see also Pham et al., 
2001, Exp. 3).  
A third potential reason is that individuals generally have very little insight into the 
inner workings of their minds, and often rely on lay theories to explain the outcome of their 
thinking (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Given the high regard that rational thought enjoys in 
western societies, it is likely that these lay theories would generally focus on content 
information and understate the influence of feelings. In light of these three potential 
explanations, it is not particularly surprising that individuals would underestimate the 
pervasive influence of feelings on their judgments. 
Interestingly, if individuals are often unaware that feelings influence judgment, one 
may entertain the speculation that the feelings themselves are possibly unconscious (e.g., 
Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005). While intriguing, this issue is largely a matter of 
debate about what a feeling is, and whether there can be affect without feeling (e.g., Clore, 
Storbeck, Robinson, & Centerbar, 2005). From the present perspective, a decisive 
characteristic of affective and cognitive feelings is that they can be experienced, which 
seems to imply at least some level of consciousness. This does not preclude the possibility, 
however, that some of the antecedents giving rise to feelings are unconscious. On the 
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contrary, feelings may be valid sources of information because they are evoked by both 
conscious and unconscious antecedents, as discussed in what follows. 
The validity of judgments based on feelings 
The ubiquity of the reliance on feelings in judgment does not, per se, make this 
reliance beneficial. For the reliance on feelings to be a sensible form of judgment, it needs to 
promote judgment validity. Indeed, if feelings were as harmful to sound judgment as is 
sometimes claimed (see Elster, 1999), one would wonder why such a mechanism would 
have evolved and persisted over time. Contrary to such pessimistic views about the reliance 
on feelings in judgment, several theoretical rationales and empirical findings suggest that the 
reliance on feelings is generally helpful for sound judgment, and that there may be “wisdom 
in feelings” (Schwarz, 2002a; see also Pham, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 2007; Stephen & 
Pham, 2008). 
A first rationale can be derived from the conceptualization of feelings as meta-
summaries, which deserves some elaboration here. Consider first affective feelings, which 
have been suggested to code the valence of a wide variety of external and endogenous 
events (e.g., Morris, 1989), such as weather conditions (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), finding a 
dime (Isen & Levin, 1972), thinking about life events (Strack et al., 1985), or reflecting on 
personal fears (Velten, 1968). Although these events may be consciously accessible, they do 
not necessarily need to be, because feelings generally “can be formed unconsciously without 
(or before) a full articulation of the specific informational content on which they are based” 
(Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999, p. 485). Moreover, different events may be coded together into 
one feeling (Clore & Parrott, 1994), allowing feelings to summarize a large amount of 
information. Therefore, in reflecting a variety of events that may have occurred both above 
and below the threshold of consciousness, affective feelings constitute powerful summaries 
that can be seen as “an integrative expression of the general state of the organism” 
(Schwarz et al., 1987, p. 70, italics added). The same is true for cognitive feelings, which 
reflect both characteristics of the activated content information, as in feelings of familiarity 
(e.g., Koriat, 1993), and characteristics of its cognitive processing, as in feelings of ease-of-
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retrieval (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Although both content and processes may be 
consciously accessible, they do not have to be, as is apparent for instance in the “tip-of-the-
tongue” phenomenon (Schwartz, 2002), which emerges despite the fact that the target 
information is not consciously accessible. Therefore, similar to their affective counterparts, 
cognitive feelings can be conceptualized as meta-summaries of events and processes that 
are activated or operate above and below the threshold of consciousness (e.g., Koriat & 
Levy-Sadot, 1999).  
This notion of feelings as meta-summaries allows for several propositions about their 
validity. First, because meta-summaries code many pieces of information simultaneously, 
feelings should be relatively efficient compared to single pieces of content information that 
need to be integrated. Second, by granting a simultaneous window onto the conscious and 
the unconscious (e.g., Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 1999), feelings can convey more information 
than is typically coded in consciously accessible content. For instance, it has been suggested 
that internal feelings may signal that “something” is wrong about the current situation, even if 
this “something” cannot be specified (Bless et al., 1996). To the extent that the weighing of a 
greater amount of independent information should generally increase judgment validity, one 
could argue that feelings should provide information that is at least as valid as, if not more 
valid than, content information. Moreover, because feelings presumably code the world 
around us continuously, they should enable a more ecological mapping onto essential 
characteristics of the surrounding world compared to content inputs, which are probably 
assessed more sporadically (see Pham, Lee, & Stephen, 2010; Stephen & Pham, 2008).  
This is not to deny that there is also ample evidence of misleading influences of 
feelings on judgment, especially in the context of scientific experimentation. One should keep 
in mind, however, that most of these experiments—such as those on the effects of incidental 
mood states—were intentionally designed to document influences of feelings that were 
seemingly illogical in order to demonstrate that feelings were used in the first place (see also 
Bless, 2002). Some experiments are even explicitly constructed so that a feeling-based 
decision will be inferior on some normative criterion (e.g., Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, 
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Damasio, & Damasio, 2005). Although it would appear that the reliance on feelings impairs 
decision making in such experiments, these experiments are not diagnostic of the true 
ecological validity of feelings outside experimental settings, because the relationship 
between feelings and the criterion is arbitrarily determined (e.g., Pham, 2007).  
More problematic are findings in which feelings were shown to result in poor 
judgments even though the occurrence of feelings and their mapping onto normative criteria 
was not experimentally manipulated. One classic example is the effect of weather-induced 
mood states on judgments and decisions (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In this case, feelings 
distorted judgments because participants failed to recognize that weather-induced feelings 
are incidental and therefore not representative of the target to be evaluated. This example 
illustrates the importance of the representativeness principle and points to the Achilles’ heel 
of the reliance on feelings in judgment. Specifically, because representativeness is primarily 
guided by temporal contiguity (e.g., Clore, Wyer et al., 2001), it may lead astray when joint 
occurrence is not indicative of causality.  
Fortunately, however, contiguity is not the sole criterion of representativeness, which 
is likely to be more accurately assessed when other diagnostic cues are available. For 
instance, Oppenheimer (2004) noted that feelings of ease-of-retrieval are generally a good 
proxy (i.e., informative or representative) for estimating the frequency of names in a 
population, as familiar names are likely to be more prevalent. Critically, however, for celebrity 
names such as the name “Bush,” frequency estimates were not influenced by participants’ 
cognitive feelings, presumably because participants spontaneously suspected a bias through 
media coverage and therefore perceived their feelings to be unrepresentative. Hence, 
although the contiguity principle renders the representativeness assessment fallible, the 
consideration of other cues likely lowers the risk of errors. In addition, one should keep in 
mind that the representativeness principle is complemented by other moderators, such as 
relevance, which further promote judgment validity. From this one may conclude that the 
processes underlying the reliance on feelings generally guard against inappropriate 
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influences, making this reliance a generally sensible strategy (see also Oppenheimer, 2004; 
Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).  
In summary, there is good reason to believe that relying on one’s feelings is not a 
definite source of error, but rather a generally sensible mechanism. First, as meta-summaries 
of a multitude of consciously or unconsciously accessible events and processes, feelings are 
particularly efficient carriers of information that are likely to be valid more often than not. 
Second, in the event that feelings are inappropriate sources of information, the two 
metacognitive assessments of representativeness and relevance are likely to guard against 
their use in judgment, at least more often than not. These conclusions are further supported 
by theorizing across the domains of affective and cognitive feelings (e.g., Bless, Keller, & 
Igou, 2009; Greifeneder, 2007; Pham, 2007, 2008; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), and by recent 
empirical findings from studies where the criterion “validity of feelings” was ecologically 
determined and not under the experimenter’s control (e.g., Pham et al., 2010; Stephen & 
Pham, 2008). Although this is speculation, we argue that it is precisely because of their high 
degree of validity that feelings have evolved to be a frequent source of influence.  
Conclusion 
The evidence reviewed here, along with related theorizing and findings, suggests that 
the reliance on affective and cognitive feelings as information in judgment is likely to be a 
frequent occurrence in daily life. We speculate that individuals are often unaware of their 
frequent reliance on feelings, that this reliance on feelings often has similar judgmental 
implications as the reliance on content information, and that it is typically not part of people’s 
overt theories of thinking. We also suggest that reliance on feelings is not, as often assumed, 
a necessarily flawed heuristic, but a generally sensible judgment strategy. 
Quo vadis: Future research on feelings and beyond 
This final section identifies four promising lines of research that emerge from this 
integrative review. The first pertains to the interplay among the various moderators of 
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reliance on feelings identified in this review, and a possible general process model of 
reliance on feelings that this interplay implies. The second sheds light on the interplay 
between feeling-based and content-based inputs and processes. The third discusses 
potential implications of our findings for dual-process models of judgment, as well as for 
research on intuition and unconscious thought. Finally, we speculate on how individuals may 
be trained in feeling-based judgment so as to further increase judgment validity. 
Toward a general process model of reliance on feelings in judgment 
While this review identified five moderator categories in descriptive fashion, it has 
remained largely silent about the sequence in which these moderators operate. This is 
because most previous empirical investigations addressed only one moderator and are thus 
uninformative about any temporal order among moderators. One important avenue for future 
research, therefore, is to clarify the temporal sequence in which the moderators operate, as 
well as their potential interrelations. A programmatic investigation of these issues would help 
to advance a comprehensive process model of the reliance of feelings in judgment—a model 
that is clearly missing from the literature.  
An initial step in this direction is Albarracín and Kumkale’s (2003) model, which posits 
that the reliance on incidental affective feelings in judgment involves two sequential stages. 
The first stage is identification of feelings, which is sensitive to salience. The second stage is 
discounting, in the course of which feelings that are perceived to be unrepresentative of the 
target are excluded from its evaluation. While this model seems appropriate and sufficient to 
describe the interplay between salience and representativeness, it does not easily 
accommodate the moderating roles exerted by other moderators such as relevance and 
malleability. For example, while it seems logical that feelings must first be noticed before they 
can be assessed for representativeness (i.e., salience precedes representativeness), it is not 
obvious that the identification of feelings necessarily precedes their assessment for 
relevance. Indeed, it may well be that high or low perceived relevance of feelings—for 
example, being asked “Do you like this movie?” versus “What time is the next show?”—
increases or decreases the salience of these feelings (relevance precedes salience). At other 
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times, however, the relevance assessment may follow or even be prompted by the salience 
of feelings. For instance, people who notice that they have unusually strong feelings about 
another person may start wondering whether these feelings are relevant when forming 
judgments about this person. This suggests that a comprehensive process model of reliance 
on feelings in judgment should accommodate the possibility of both (a) early selection of and 
attention to feelings as a basis for judgment, and (b) late inclusion or discounting of 
(previously) noticed feelings in judgment. Such a model should also clarify the stage (or 
stages) at which judgment malleability comes into play. It could be early in the process 
sequence—possibly as a determinant of whether feelings are attended to in the first place—
or later in the process sequence—possibly during an interpretation of the judgment 
implications of the feelings or during judgment integration. To address these conjectures, and 
to advance a comprehensive process model, future research will need to simultaneously 
investigate several moderators in ways similar to Albarracín and Kumkale (2003). 
Methodological emphasis should be placed on discerning the temporal sequence of and the 
possible interrelations between different moderator categories.  
Interdependence of feeling-based and content-based inputs and processes 
A second avenue of future research may be to focus on the independence or 
interdependence of feeling-based and content-based inputs and processes. Given evidence 
that feelings are instantiated almost immediately upon exposure to targets (e.g., Zajonc, 
1980), monitored continuously (e.g., Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003), and often primary in 
judgment (e.g., Pham et al., 2001; see also Greifeneder & Bless, 2007; Ruder & Bless, 
2003), one wonders to what extent feelings and content information are truly independent as 
opposed to interdependent sources of information. Consider findings by Bless (1995), who 
asked individuals to recall events of their kindergarten time. Consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Bower, 1981), happy individuals recalled more positive (and less negative) 
events than sad individuals. However, this mood-congruent-recall effect was more 
pronounced if participants were first asked to form a global evaluation of their kindergarten 
time. This is presumably because individuals answered the global evaluation based on a 
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“How-do-I-feel-about-it?” heuristic, which then served as a retrieval cue for consciously 
accessible content in memory. Along with other conceptually related results (Pham et al., 
2001; Yeung & Wyer, 2004), this finding suggests that initial feelings may bias subsequent 
content processing in a confirmatory way. As such, this finding questions the often implicit 
assumption that feelings and content information are independent sources of information. 
Consequently, future research may fruitfully explore the likely temporal interplay between 
feelings and content information in judgment—an issue that the moderators identified in this 
review may help to clarify. For instance, if feelings and content information are processed as 
independent inputs, the greater the relevance of feelings, the less people may rely on 
content information. However, if content information is in fact used to validate initial feeling 
reactions, the greater the relevance of feelings, the more people may process feeling-
consistent information, as observed by Yeung and Wyer (2004). More generally, whereas 
previous research has mostly focused on experimental situations in which feelings were 
orthogonal or conflicting with content information, future research may fruitfully devote more 
attention to situations where the two types of inputs are positively correlated, so as to further 
understand their interdependence.  
Implications for dual-process models of judgment as well as for research on intuition  
and unconscious thought  
Research on the reliance on feeling versus content information in judgment often 
builds on dual-process models that distinguish, for instance, between “heuristic versus 
systematic” processing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), “experiential versus rational” processing 
(Epstein et al., 1996), “associative versus ruled-based” reasoning (Sloman, 1996), “impulsive 
versus reflective” processes (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), or “system 1 versus system 2” 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). For all of these models, it is important to understand under 
which conditions one type of process is more likely to be engaged than the other. We 
speculate that the moderators of reliance on feelings identified in this review may be linked to 
the principles that channel the different modes of processing. For example, the “impulsive” 
determinants of behavior posited by Strack and Deutsch (2004) may be more operative 
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under high perceived representativeness or relevance. Thus, while this review focused 
explicitly on the reliance on feelings versus content in judgment, its findings may have much 
broader implications beyond the realms of feelings.  
Our findings on the reliance on feelings versus content in judgment may also have 
important connections with research on the contrast between conscious and unconscious or 
intuitive modes of information processing. The latter research typically finds that intuitive or 
unconscious modes of thinking may sometimes be superior to explicit or conscious modes of 
thinking (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). For instance, in an early study, 
Wilson and colleagues (1993) observed that individuals who were asked to explicitly 
articulate why they preferred certain alternatives over others before making a choice were 
more likely to subsequently regret their choices than individuals who were not asked to 
articulate their rationale beforehand. Relatedly, Dijksterhuis (2004) found that individuals who 
were prevented from consciously thinking about a set of alternatives they had to choose 
from—presumably enabling unconscious thought—were more likely to select normatively 
superior options compared to individuals who were allowed to think consciously.  
Both of these conceptual frameworks are largely silent about one critical question: 
How do the unconscious or implicit processes become registered consciously, so that they 
can be articulated? We speculate that feelings may play a critical role in this process. 
Specifically, the success of unconscious thought or intuitive decision strategies may rest, at 
least in part, on individuals’ reliance on feelings which code, as meta-summaries, a large 
variety of conscious and unconscious inputs. If our speculation is correct, the conditions in 
which unconscious or intuitive strategies guide decisions should neither be constant, nor vary 
arbitrarily. Rather, they should be a systematic function of the set of moderators identified in 
this review.  
Training people in feeling-based judgment 
Although we argue that the reliance on feelings is a generally sensible judgment 
strategy, we also recognize that feelings may sometimes lead us astray, particularly when 
incidental feelings are erroneously perceived to be representative of the target, and when 
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feelings are not or negatively correlated with normative criteria such as long-term self-interest 
or social welfare (see Pham, 2007). Accordingly, future research may fruitfully explore 
interventions to educate individuals about when (and when not) to rely on their feelings to 
make judgments and decisions.  
Given that momentary feelings are generally assumed to be representative of the 
target, people may benefit from (a) greater awareness of the pervasive effects of incidental 
feelings on judgment, and (b) more refined conceptions of representativeness. Specifically, it 
would appear fruitful to make individuals aware that affective and cognitive feelings may be 
incidental—for instance, feelings from sunny (or rainy) weather, a friendly salesperson, an 
easy request for a small number of exemplars or the difficulty of reading a degraded text 
font—and that such incidental feelings may distort judgments. Moreover, judgment validity 
would likely be enhanced if individuals held more refined conceptions of representativeness 
that go beyond the principle of contiguity. To date, there is some evidence that in certain 
domains and situations people have refined conceptions of representativeness 
(Oppenheimer, 2004; Raghunathan et al., 2006). However, more research is needed to allow 
for a complete picture.  
While more refined naïve theories of representativeness appear commendable, it 
should be kept in mind that increasing individuals’ sensitivity to the “real” source of their 
feelings likely compromises a primary benefit of the reliance on feelings in judgment: the 
frugality of this process as a heuristic. An important question, therefore, concerns the level of 
abstraction at which lay theories of representativeness should be formulated? Another 
question is whether representativeness is represented propositionally or associatively. If it is 
represented propositionally, explicit information about objective principles of 
representativeness may be effective; however, if it is represented associatively, lay theories 
of representativeness would need to be developed through repeated associative learning.  
Apart from representativeness, training in feeling-based judgment should focus on 
why feelings are more useful in certain environments than in others. For example, the 
advantage of relying on feelings seems to grow with the environment’s richness and 
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complexity (e.g., Pham et al., 2010). Relatedly, feelings are logically bound to be more 
helpful in environments where there is a positive and strong correlation between their 
evaluative implications and the target’s “true” criterion value. It will be interesting to 
investigate to what extent individuals are aware of such environmental contingencies, and 
how relevant naïve theories would need to be formulated so as to promote judgment validity. 
Should interventions prove successful in educating individuals about when to rely on their 
feelings, people would undoubtedly be even better served by their feelings.  
General conclusion 
Multidisciplinary evidence suggests that feelings may influence judgments of various 
kinds. However, just because a certain effect can occur does not mean that it is ecologically 
important. It is therefore critical to investigate the conditions under which this effect occurs 
(Zanna & Fazio, 1982). The goal of this review was to formalize the conditions under which 
feelings are more likely to be relied on in judgment. The review identified five major 
categories of moderators of this reliance: salience of the feeling, representativeness to the 
target, relevance to the judgment, malleability of the judgment, and processing intensity. 
Importantly, the category structure and the reported pattern of results were remarkably 
similar for affective and cognitive feelings, suggesting that affective and cognitive feelings 
operate in largely parallel fashion. In addition to granting insights about moderation, the 
reviewed evidence allowed for important theoretical conclusions about the ecology of 
feelings-as-information. It was concluded that the use of feelings as information is a frequent 
event, much more frequent than is often assumed. Moreover, this influence is not necessarily 
undesirable: the reliance on feeling may be a generally sensible judgment strategy. 
Therefore, it may be time to have more faith in the evidentiary status of feelings.  
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Footnotes 
1 Many findings in the domain of affective feelings are, in and of themselves, not telling 
about the underlying process. In the typical paradigm used to investigate the influence of 
affective feelings on judgments, participants are induced to experience either a positive or 
negative incidental mood state (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983, Exp. 1), or they are 
presented with a judgmental target that itself elicits positive versus negative (integral) 
feelings (e.g., Yeung & Wyer, 2005). Subsequently, participants are asked to form a 
judgment, such as indicating their general life satisfaction or evaluating a proposed brand 
extension. Typical results show more positive judgments when experiencing positive as 
compared to negative moods, or when evaluating targets eliciting positive as opposed to 
negative integral feelings. Findings such as these can be produced either by feelings 
being used as information (FI-account), or by feelings priming related thought content 
(priming-account). To be diagnostic of the underlying process, such studies need to either 
include process measures that are consistent with the assumptions of one or the other 
account (e.g., mood-congruent thought listings), or document boundary conditions that 
would be predicted by one or the other account (e.g., attribution to a target irrelevant 
source). Without such additional evidence, strong conclusions favoring one or the other 
process account are precluded. In this respect, Forgas (1992b, p. 869) notes that “neither 
memory nor impression-formation data constitute direct evidence about processing 
differences” (see also Schwarz, 2002b; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), and argues for the 
analysis of processing latencies. Given these considerations, the following inclusion 
criterion was applied: Studies investigating moderating conditions of the influence of 
feelings were included, unless the availability of related thought content (but not 
previously provided or previously self-generated information) or processing latencies 
suggest that the impact of feelings on judgments was mediated by content-priming. 
2  The results reported by Kühnen (2010) hold that feelings of ease-of-retrieval influence 
judgments, particularly when made salient by means of a manipulation check. Since other 
researchers reported ease-of-retrieval effects even when the manipulation check was 
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assessed after the judgments (e.g., Greifeneder et al., 2009a; Schwarz et al., 1991) or not 
at all (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), it would appear unjustified to conclude from this 
evidence that ease-of-retrieval effects are restricted to conditions in which the 
manipulation check is assessed first. Rather, it seems that assessing the manipulation 
check prior to the dependent variables is one way of increasing the feelings’ context-
related salience. 
3  The terms representativeness and relevance have at times been used interchangeably in 
the literature, without a common agreed-upon conceptual distinction. This ambiguity 
conflicts with the objective of this review, which is to provide a clear and mutually 
exclusive set of moderators. Therefore, findings were categorized according to the 
definitions provided here, even if it resulted in an assignment of studies to categories 
different from the labeling initially chosen by the studies’ original authors. 
4 The findings reported by Forgas (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1995b) as well as Forgas and 
Moylan (1991) have been accrued within the conceptual framework of the priming-
account. However, as the reported evidence is compatible with the general tenets of the 
FI-account, including these findings in the present review appears warranted. Yet, it 
should be noted that the authors presumed atypicality to be associated with more 
elaborate processing, which contrasts with the presently assumed position that 
malleability is independent of processing intensity. To underscore their argument, Forgas 
(1992b), for instance, reported that atypical targets are better remembered than typical 
targets, supposedly because atypical targets are processed more intensively. However, 
as discussed earlier and stated by others (e.g., Forgas, 1992b, p. 869; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007), alternative explanations for better memory performance are viable. Given this 
latitude in interpretation, it appears warranted, at present, to maintain the argument that 
malleability is independent of processing intensity. 
 When feelings are used as information      - 84 - 
Authors’ note 
This research was supported by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
within the SFB-504 of the University of Mannheim, a post-doctoral research grant from the 




 When feelings are used as information      - 85 - 
Tables 
Table 1 
Salience of Feelings Moderates Their Impact on Judgments 
Conceptual differentiation of 
moderators 
Methodological operationalization  
of moderators 
Reliance on  
feelings …  
Author(s) 
Affective feelings 
Context-related E: Positioning of mood questionnaire before 
vs. after assessment of dependent 
variables 
… when mood is assessed before 
judgments. 
Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998;  
White & McFarland, 2009, Exp. 1 
Context-related E: Instruction to become sensitive (or not) to 
emotional reactions 
… when salience of mood exceeds a 
threshold. 
Albarracín & Kumkale, 2003, Exp. 3 
Context-related E: Variation in processing intensity (low vs. 
moderate) to influence spontaneous 
identification of feelings 
… when processing intensity is 
moderate. 
Albarracín & Kumkale, 2003, Exp. 1 & 2 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on  
Trait Meta-Mood Scale 
… when tendency to pay attention to 
feelings is high. 
Gasper & Clore, 2000, Exp. 1 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on  
Affect Intensity Measure 
… when affective experiences are 
strongly experienced. 
Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1994* 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on  
Style of Processing scale 
… with individual tendency to visualize, 
thereby putting feelings into focus. 
Pham, 1998, Exp. 1 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on 
Openness to Feeling Scale 
… when openness to feelings is high. Ciarrochi & Forgas, 2000*; Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2001* 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on  
Consumer-Impulsiveness Scale 
… when impulsivity is high (and 
processing resources are low), 
thereby narrowing the focus to 
feelings. 
Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999, Exp. 2 
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Cognitive feelings 
Context-related E: Positioning of manipulation check before 
vs. after assessment of dependent 
variables 
… when manipulation check was 
assessed before judgments. 
Kühnen, 2010 
Context-related E: Manipulation of contextual salience via  
task wording 
… when cognitive feelings are 
contextually salient. 
Raghubir & Menon, 2005, Exp. 2 
Context-related E: Manipulation of contextual salience via task 
procedures and priming 
… when cognitive feelings are 
contextually salient. 
Hansen & Wänke, 2008 
Notes. E = Experimental, Q = Quasi-experimental. * These findings have been accrued in the context of the priming-account, but can be reconciled with 
the FI-account’s central tenets. A pivotal test in favor of the priming-account includes measures of related-thought mediation (see Footnote 1), which, 
however, were not assessed in these studies. 
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Table 2 
Representativeness Moderates the Impact of Feelings on Judgments 
Conceptual differentiation of 
moderators 
Methodological operationalization  
of moderators 
Reliance on  





E: Provision of real vs. alleged sources for 
feelings 
 
… when no target-unrelated source is 
made salient.  
e.g., Gorn, Goldberg, & Basu, 1993; Pham, 1998, Exp. 3; 
Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006, Exp. 1;  
Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998  
 
Backward-inference E: Variation of attributions: Self- vs. situation-
referent attributions 
… when making self-referent 
attributions. 
Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993, Exp. 3 
Backward-inference E: Assessment of mood before vs. after 
dependent variables 
Q: Statistical categorization based on Trait 
Meta-Mood Scale and Mood Awareness 
Scale 
… when individuals do not correct for 
biasing feelings.  
McFarland, White, & Newth, 2003 
Backward-inference Q: Statistical categorization based on recall 
performance 
Q: Statistical categorization based on political 
information test 
… when expertise is low. Ottati & Isbell, 1996 
Forward-inference E: Judgments about personal vs. impersonal 
risks 
...  when evaluating personal risks. Gasper & Clore, 1998, Exp. 2 
Forward-inference E: Timing of evaluation of several targets … for the first option to be evaluated. Qiu & Yeung, 2008 
Forward-inference E: Judging for the self vs. others … when judging for the self. Hsee & Weber, 1997;  
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001;  
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999, Exp. 3 
Forward-inference E: Self- vs. object-referent evaluations … only for self-referent evaluations. Gorn, Pham, & Sin, 2001, Exp. 2 
Backward- and Forward-
inference 
E: Variation of attributions and judgmental 
targets 
… when feelings are attributed to the 
target. 
Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 1993, Exp. 2 
Backward- and Forward-
inference 
E: Decision domains related vs. unrelated to 
source of feelings 
… when source of feelings is related to 
the decision domain. 
Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006, Exp. 2 
(for conceptually related evidence: Shen & Wyer, 2008) 




E: Provision of real vs. alleged sources of 
feelings 
 
… when no target-unrelated source is 
made salient. 
e.g. Greifeneder & Bless, 2007, Exp. 3;  
Menon & Raghubir, 2003, Exp. 2; Raghubir & Menon, 
2001; Ruder & Bless, Exp. 3; Sanna & Schwarz, 2003;  
Schwarz et al., 1991, Exp. 3; Wänke, Schwarz, Bless, 
1995; Winkielman, Schwarz, & Belli, 1998  
Forward-inference E: Self- vs. other-related judgments … when forming self-related 
judgments. 
Caruso, 2008; Raghubir & Menon, 1998 
Forward-inference E: Judgments about the outgroup or close 
friends vs. the ingroup or casual 
acquaintances 
… for judgments about the outgroup 
and close friends. 
Rothman & Hardin, 1997 
Notes. E = Experimental, Q = Quasi-experimental. Studies in the subcategories “attribution about source of feelings” are not cited comprehensively but in 
exemplary fashion. 
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Table 3 
Relevance Moderates the Impact of Feelings on Judgments 
Conceptual differentiation of 
moderators 
Methodological operationalization  
of moderators 
Reliance on  
feelings …  
Author(s) 
Affective feelings 
Context-related E: Variation of consummatory vs. utilitarian 
goals 
… when consummatory goals prevail. Geuens, Pham, & De Pelsmaker, 2010; Pham, 1998;  
Yeung & Wyer, 2004 (see Adaval, 2001, for conceptually 
related evidence) 
Context-related E: Priming of ideals vs. oughts … when promotion focus prevails. Pham & Avnet, 2004, Exp. 1 to 3, 2009, Exp. 3 and 4 
Context-related E: Variation of compatibility between 
achievement vs. protection feelings and 
according judgmental goals  
… when judgmental goals are 
compatible with affective feelings. 
Bosmans & Baumgartner, 2005 
Context-related E: Instructions to use feelings vs. facts as 
basis for judgments 
… when feelings are suggested to be 
used for judgments. 
Gasper & Clore, 2000, Exp. 2; Pham, 1998, Exp. 2; 
Scarabis, Florack, & Gosejohann, 2006; White & 
McFarland, 2009, Exp. 1 (see Adaval, 2001, Exp. 2, for 
conceptually related evidence) 
Context-related E: Manipulation of perceived prior success 
when relying on feelings as information 
… when prior reliance on feelings is 
perceived as successful.  
Avnet & Pham, 2007 
Context-related E: Decisions about present vs. future 
outcomes 
… when deciding about present 
outcomes. 
Chang & Pham, 2010 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on State 
Trait Anxiety Inventory 
...  when state experiences are 
consistent with trait experiences.  
Gasper & Clore, 1998 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on Selves 
Questionnaire 
… when promotion focus prevails. Pham & Avnet, 2004, Exp. 4, 2009, Exp. 1 and 2 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
E: Recall of memories pertaining to life 
episodes high or low in self-worth 
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Cognitive feelings 
Context-related E: Manipulation of mood states … in conditions of positive mood. Ruder & Bless, 2003 
Disposition-related Q: Selection of experts vs. laymen … by laymen. Ofir, 2000 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on prior 
knowledge in domain 
… in conditions of non-existent  
prior knowledge. 
Florack & Zoabi, 2003 
Disposition-related E: Variation of familiarity with target 
E: Provision of domain-relevant knowledge via 
priming 
… in conditions of moderate knowledge 
accessibility. 
Tybout, Sternthal, Malaviya, Bakamitsos, & Park, 2005 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on 
Allgemeine Depressions Skala or Beck 
Depression Inventory 
… by low-depressive individuals. Greifeneder & Bless, 2008 
Disposition-related Q: Statistical categorization based on Faith in 
Intuition Scale 
… when faith in intuition is high. Keller & Bless, 2008 
Disposition-related Q: Selection of managers vs. subordinates 
Q: Statistical categorization based on Revised 
Interpersonal Adjectives Scale 
E: Recall of prior powerful vs. non-powerful 
situations 
… by powerful people. Weick & Guinote, 2008 
Notes. E = Experimental, Q = Quasi-experimental.  
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Table 4 
Evaluative Malleability of Judgments Moderates the Impact of Feelings on Judgments 
Conceptual differentiation of 
moderators 
Methodological operationalization  
of moderators 
Reliance on  
feelings …  
Author(s) 
Affective feelings 
Judgment-related E: Variation in specificity of judgment … when forming global judgments. Forgas, 1990*; Gorn, Goldberg, & Basu, 1993;  
Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987 
 
Judgment-related E: Variation in centrality of self-conceptions … when peripheral self-conceptions 
are evaluated. 
Sedikides, 1995* 
Judgment-related Q: Selection of experts vs. novices to vary 
existence of judgmental molds 
… by novices. Forgas & Tehani, 2005* 
Target-related E: Variation in valence of targets … when targets were affectively 
neutral. 
Isen & Shalker, 1982* 
Target-related E: Variation in valence of targets … when targets were affectively 
ambiguous. 
Gorn, Pham, & Sin, 2001 
Target-related E: Variation in taste of targets … when the target product was of 
“neutral” taste. 
Miniard, Bhatla, & Sirdeshmukh, 1992  
Target-related E: Variation in familiarity of target … when forming judgments about 
unfamiliar events. 
Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989, Exp. 3* 
Target-related E: Variation in typicality of targets … when judging atypical targets. Forgas, 1992a*, 1992b*, 1993*, 1995b*;  
Forgas & Moylan, 1991* 
Target-related E: Variation in amount of target information … when targets were presented 
without further information. 
Bakamitsos, 2006, Exp. 1; Fedorikhin & Cole, 2004, Exp. 2 
Target-related E: Variation in importance assigned to 
additional target information 
… when additional attribute information 
is not qualified.  
Fedorikhin & Cole, 2004, Exp. 3 
Target-related Q: Selection of experts vs. novices to vary 
amount of target information 
… by novices.  Srull, 1987, Exp. 3 
Target-related E: Manipulation of timing  … when no prior evaluation has been 
formed.  
Fedorikhin & Cole, 2004, Exp. 1; Srull, 1987, Exp. 2; 
Yeung & Wyer, 2004, 2005, Exp. 2 
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Cognitive feelings 
Judgment-related Q: Statistical categorization based on Modern 
Sexism Scale 
… by low-prejudiced individuals. Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock, 1999 
Judgment-related Q: Selection of individuals with extreme vs. 
moderate attitudes based on earlier mass-
pretesting  
… by participants with  
moderate attitudes. 
Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999 
Notes. E = Experimental, Q = Quasi-experimental. * These findings have been accrued in the context of the priming-account, but can be reconciled with 
the FI-account’s central tenets. A pivotal test in favor of the priming-account includes measures of related-thought mediation (see Footnote 1), which, 
however, were not assessed in these studies. 
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Table 5 
Processing Intensity Moderates the Impact of Feelings on Judgments 
Conceptual differentiation of 
moderators 
Methodological operationalization  
of moderators 
Reliance on  
feelings …  
Author(s) 
Affective feelings 
Processing motivation Q: Statistical categorization based on Need 
for Cognition Scale 
… when need for cognition is low. Batra & Stayman, 1990;  
Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993, Exp. 1 
Processing motivation E: Variation in personal relevance by linking 
incentive to experimental materials vs. not  
… when personal relevance is low. Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993, Exp. 2 
Processing motivation E: Variation in personal relevance by 
informing participants about the potential of 
a newspaper interview 
… when personal relevance is low. Bosmans & Baumgartner, 2005, Exp. 2 
Processing motivation  E: Variation in relevance by focus on 
judgmental target vs. peripheral cue 
Q: Statistical categorization based on various 
measures of attitudinal partisanship 
… when personal relevance is low. Isbell & Wyer, 1999 
Processing motivation E: Variation in personal relevance by telling 
participants that judgmental target may be 
important for themselves vs. not 
… when personal relevance is low. Albarracín & Kumkale, 2003 
Processing opportunity E: Variation of time pressure and task 
competition 
… when opportunity is low. Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998 
Processing opportunity E: Variation of task competition by 
remembering a few- vs. many-digit number 
… when task competition is high.  Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999, 2002 
Processing opportunity E: Variation of time pressure  … when time pressure is high.  Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, & Hughes, 2001, Exp. 3 
Processing opportunity E: Memory- vs. stimuli-based choice … when making memory-based 
choices. 
Rottenstreich, Sood, & Brenner, 2007 
Processing opportunity E: Variation in distractiveness of background 
sounds 
… when distraction is high. Albarracín & Kumkale, 2003; Albarracín & Wyer, 2001 
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Cognitive feelings 
Processing motivation Q: Statistical categorization based on family 
history of heart disease 
E: Variation of personal relevance by focusing 
retrieval task on self vs. average man 
… when personal relevance is low. Rothman & Schwarz, 1998 
Processing motivation Q: Selection based on scores of Rape Myth 
Acceptance Scale 
… when personal relevance is low.  Grayson & Schwarz, 1999 
Processing motivation Q: Statistical categorization based on personal 
interest in politics 
… when personal relevance is low. Haddock, 2002 
Processing motivation Q: Statistical categorization based on Need 
for Cognition Scale 
… when need for cognition is low. Florack & Zoabi, 2003 
Processing motivation E: Variation in personal relevance by thinking 
about trivial vs. serious disease symptoms 
… when personal relevance is low.  Broemer, 2004, Exp. 3 
Processing motivation E: Variation of personal relevance by 
announcement of justification 
… when personal relevance is low.  Greifeneder, 2007, Exp. 2 
Processing motivation E: Variation in accuracy motivation by asking 
for accurate vs. rough judgments 
… when accuracy motivation is low. Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999, Exp. 2; 
Greifeneder, 2007, Exp. 1 
Processing motivation Q: Statistical categorization based on Labile 
Self-Esteem Scale 
E: Manipulation of certainty vs. uncertainty 
salience 
… when uncertainty is low. Greifeneder, Müller, Stahlberg, van den Bos, & Bless, 
2009a, 2009b; Müller, Greifeneder, Stahlberg, van den 
Bos, & Bless, 2010 
Processing motivation Q: Statistical categorization based on Need 
for Cognition Scale 
… when need for cognition is high. Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002, Exp. 1; 
Wänke & Bless, 2000, Exp. 1 
Processing motivation E: Variation in accuracy by instruction to 
report accurate vs. spontaneous reactions 
… when accuracy motivation is high.  Wänke & Bless, 2000, Exp. 2 
Processing motivation E: Variation of personal relevance by several 
measures 
… when personal relevance is high. Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002, Exp. 2 
Processing motivation Q: Statistical categorization based on Need for 
Structure Scale 
… when need for structure is high. Hirt, Kardes, & Markman, 2004 
Processing opportunity E: Variation of task competition by 
remembering a few- vs. many-digit number 
… when opportunity is low. Greifeneder & Bless, 2007 
Notes. E = Experimental, Q = Quasi-experimental. 
